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Figure 1.0: The MIT Chapel (built in 1956), was designed by architect Eero Saarinen as
a religious place, but without particular denomination. A small round brick building,
it is recognized as an efficacious model of mid-century modern. Saarinen creates
a palpable experience manifesting or affording a humanity through the shadows,
twinkle of the suspending sculpture behind an altar, the light descending from oculus
above, the reflected light from the water outside highlighting the undulating brick
walls with rusticated handicraft of the masonry. (Image by Bob Condia, 2020.)

How architecture affords being-in-the-world? This seemingly
simple yet pervasive question within architectural scholarship and
practice has been reinvigorated in recent years through the embodied
and experiential turn i.e., a paradigmatic turn highlighting the primacy of
the body and experience as drivers of architectural design. This steady
infusion of architectural research with the insights, theories, and methods
from embodied cognition, philosophy of mind, ecological psychology,
and neuroscience, among other fields, is clearly reflected in the theme of
this symposium and the contributions gathered on the following pages.
The essay by Sarah Robinson directly addresses this question right
from the opening, illuminating quote by John Hejduk. The evoked image
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Introduction: Designing Affordances for the Living-Lived Body?

of a ‘rocking chair as the soul of the porch’ helps unfold the relationship
between the body, mind, and environment as one of life, in its full biological
and phenomenological sense. By recasting—or better yet, reminding—
the reader that architecture should be thought of in terms of relations,
connections, processes, couplings of action and movement, Robinson
places the concept of affordances in a natural relationship to design. In
her account, performative and generative affordances are proposed as a
way to focus designers’ thinking on the body acting, interacting, and living
in space. Tracing a similar line of thought, Harry Mallgrave’s essay calls
for a shift of prevailing, albeit misconceived, priorities of architectural
profession by moving from ‘object to experience’ way of understanding and
designing architecture. To design and create built environments fit for the
human organism as a whole (i.e., as a multisensory, emotional, hormonal,
social, and cultural bodily subject) is a forgotten task of architects (perhaps
an ethical one?) to secure our way of being-in-the-world as living, feeling,
encultured organisms—our ‘paradise on earth’. According to Mallgrave,
the notion of affordances thereby highlights the relational nature between
the built space and the human being as attunement with action-related
prospects in organism’s spatial surroundings. The third and last essay by
James R. Hamilton rounds off this discussion by raising two significant
questions. The first question on whether affordances can be perceived
by users in a particular, predesignated manner, pinpoints to an important
consideration of complementarity between materialized intentionality
of a designer and a perceiver’s intentionality as an ability to act on an
affordances. Hamilton’s second question of what kind of ‘data’ would be
of need and help to designers to ensure an intended action on a designed
affordance hints at the complexity of design process, and in particular the
task of translating the multiplicity of affordances available to human form
of life into architectural and urban environments.
Accordingly, I would suggest that the allure and promise of the
concept of affordances is twofold. Firstly, it emphasizes the interdependent,
relational connection between the bodily subject and the environment in a
way that brings forth an understanding of architecture and designed spaces
as a set—or to borrow Rietveld and Kiverstein’s term—a rich ‘landscape
of affordances’ (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). This relational stance can
be further valued for its correspondence to the long standing tradition
of phenomenological thought in architectural scholarship arguing that

Introduction: Designing Affordances for the Living-Lived Body?
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Figure 1.1: “The end-of-siting,” can a theory of affordances suggest new bodyarchitecture relationships?
https://www.raaaf.nl/en/projects/927_the_end_of_sitting/972
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such connectedness between the inhabitant and the space is a prime
characteristics of what means to dwell and to be in the world. Secondly,
the notion of affordances—with its origin in ecological psychology, but
readily taken within other fields such as neuroscience—shows a promise
of a shared vocabulary that can ease the bridging between architecture
and cognitive science disciplines, and thereby, possibly provide a way to
operationalize the investigation of architecture-body relationship. Several
illustrative examples of this dialogue readily spring to mind, including
the ‘End of Sitting’ (figure 1.1) and ‘Hardcore Heritage’ design projects
by RAAAF, informed and shaped by ecological-enactive cognition
framework (Rietveld & Rietveld, 2017; Rietveld, Rietveld, Mackic, Waalwijk
Van Doorn, & Bervoets, 2015); a set of empirical studies by ecological
psychologists exploring children’s perception and engagement with play
affordances based on well-known Aldo van Eyck’s playgrounds (Withagen
& Caljouw, 2017); or a recent neuroscientific study of sensorimotor brain
dynamics in relation to architectural affordances (Djebbara, Fich, Petrini,
& Gramann, 2019).
Taken in sum, these three essays clearly indicate the value of
considering the concept of affordances in the context of architecture,
and provide a valuable contribution to this discussion of how to conceive,
think, and design the inherent coupling between the human organism and
the environment.
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The rocking chair is the soul of the porch.
Remove it and all you have left is white
pine for the carpenter ants.
-John Hejduk1

Figure 2.0: Front porch with rocking chairs. Image by Ronnie Vlonner on Flickr
https://www.flickr.com/photos/photobyronnie/2183753116/in/photostream/

1.

John Hejduk, Such Places as Memory: Poems, 1953-1996, Boston, MIT, 1998, 39.
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The poet’s gift is to distill the essence of something complex to
a few lines. Here the poet is also an architect who, seemingly innocent of
the pretenses that burden his profession, gets straight to the point. The
rocking chair unites body with place, makes the porch a place fit for human
habitation. Yet, in architecture we have little regard for chairs, much less
those that rock, and we certainly no longer speak of souls. That a rocking
chair could be the soul of the porch is contrary to everything we learn
in architecture school. We are still taught according to the Renaissance
conception that understands man as the subject and the world and nature
as objects—one that renders architecture a static form in which other,
lesser objects are contained; not something to be inhabited, but an object
to be fetishized from afar. I remember feeling annoyed when I was asked
to do a furniture layout in my floor plan because I did not want to be
mistaken for an interior designer, so thoroughly did I swallow the tacit
notion that the almighty realm of architecture did not bother with matters
so mundane.
But here, Hejduk suggests another alternative: the chair rocks in
rhythm to our movement, and this rocking is the beating heart of the
porch. This is more than the subject, the hypertrophic “I” encountering
an inert object, it is a fusion of subject and object in their mutual animacy,
as well as the fusion of form and function: the form of the porch at the
outcropping of the building affords a place for a chair, which in turn
affords rocking, which in turn releases cascades of pleasure and relaxation
in our body, which in turn adjusts our affective state, which then modulates
our attitude towards the world. Without the chair, there is no possibility
for human habitation—the chair renders an otherwise inert object into
a building/porch/chair/body/pleasure system. This example provides a
way of thinking about architecture not in terms of objects within objects,
but in terms of relationships, links, connections, couplings of action
and movement. Architecture and furnishing are no longer completely
distinct, nor are environment and action, nor are form and function;
here architecture is understood as a matrix of dynamic interdependent
relationships.
To truly understand architecture as a verb—as the dynamic
tissue of connection, means rethinking some of the basic tenets that our
profession holds so dear. And this rethinking is also a reimagining—one
that calls us to leave behind familiar terrain so that we might return to it

Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of Design
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with fresh eyes. And thankfully there are those who have forged ahead of
us who can serve as our guides along the way. J. J. Gibson and his partner
Eleanor are two such pioneers, their discovery of ecological perception,
which was radical in their time, is the consensus view of perception held
today. Yet, in the intervening five decades we have scarcely considered
the implications of their theories for architectural design. Truly reckoning
with the profoundly ecological nature of the way we exist in the world
means that we must reimagine our discipline on terms of movement
rather than stasis, embedded umwelts rather than from isolated atoms,
verbs instead of nouns—to go from form to forming, from opposition
to complementarity, from space to place, from time to occasion, from
anonymity to atmosphere and from abstractions to affordances.

From Vitruvius to the Body Electric

Figure 2.1: Woman being measured during
the Cleveland Health Museum Contest

Figure 2.2: The End of Average Statue at
the Cleveland Museum of Art.

quantitative significance, which for centuries was considered to be of only
secondary importance.
Understanding the body not as a complex and dynamic boundary,
but as an object among objects specified by its outward quantitative
specifications is a habit of thinking that we have yet to fully overcome.
Consider the example of study conducted by the Cleveland School of
Medicine2 in 1943 whose goal was to determine the dimensions of the
average or “normal” woman. In order to do this, they averaged the data
gathered on 15,0000 young adult women and created the statue named
“Norma” (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). To their surprise, they found that less
than one percent of the actual women came even close to matching even
half of Norma’s dimensions. Seven years later, the US Air Force, in their
effort to understand why so many of their fighter jets were crashing—
sometimes up to 17 times per day—deduced that perhaps the cockpits
were no longer sized to fit the pilots. In high speed, fast acting situations,
the cockpit and the pilot demanded a hand in glove fit. Figure 2.3. To test
their hypothesis, they conducted a study to find the size of the average
pilot. In their analysis of the bodily dimensions of 4063 men, they found

Urla & Swedlund, (2000) “The anthropometry of Barbie. Unsettling ideals of the feminine body in popular culture” from Schiebinger, L, Feminism and the Body, 412.
2.

Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of Design

The most basic ground of our inquiry must begin with the way
we understand our bodies. If you think I am exaggerating when I claim
that architectural thinking still adheres to an obsolete paradigm, consider
the way we continue to conceive of the human body, the rightful subject
of our architectural designs. The Vitruvian man splayed over a geometric
grid is the primary image that has guided our discipline for centuries, even
though the context from which that ideal arose has radically changed. For
Vitruvius the ideal proportions of architecture derived from the ideal
proportions of the human body. In his Ptolemaic world picture, cosmic
proportions were reiterated in the natural world, the human body was
considered the most perfect expression of natural and cosmic order and
was understood in terms of this larger system. The Renaissance reaffirmed
the Vitruvian ideal considering man as the measure of all things; and it is
important to remember that the essential meaning of the word measure
meant ‘boundary‘ or ‘limit’—measure implied moderation, and had a
relative and qualitative, as well as a quantitative meaning. Beauty, wisdom
and health were the consequences of moderation, mental and physical
balance was the consequence of having everything in its proper measure.
By the time Le Corbusier’s modulor man arrived, the body had been
reduced to a static yardstick—and “ideal” proportions were exemplified
a 6’0” tall male body builder. The body had long since been torn from its
biological and cosmic matrix, and was considered to be a machine. We lost
the sense of measure as a boundary and a proportion and retained only its
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Figure 2.3: Shown here is a Spitfire cockpit for fighter pilots as the early archetype for the
rigorous one size fits all thinking for male bodies. Image from David Stoddart Photograph.
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think.”4 Indeed, the old dualisms between body/mind/world have finally
given way to an understanding of the living human organism embedded
interactively in our environments. Our images of the body must begin to
express this body/mind/ecological system. Even the Air Force figured
out seven decades ago, that we need to design for a moving, dynamic
body—but now we must go further, to design for a vulnerable, aging,
multi-gendered body extending interdependently into its surroundings—
one that by its very nature cannot be reduced to a static ideal.

From One Size Fits All to Umwelt

J.J. Gibson would perhaps have appreciated the example of
cockpit redesign, because implicit in the story is that the capabilities of the
pilot were constrained or afforded by the design of the cockpit. Optimal
performance depended upon the appropriate fit between the pilot’s body
and the controls of the airplane. The cockpit is a very real extension of
the pilot’s body, enabling both to do what neither could do alone. One
could even say that the cockpit is the pilot’s umwelt. Umwelt5, which is
German for life-world, is a term the Estonian biologist Jakob Von Uexküll
coined to express how an animal cannot be understood apart from its
particular environment. While many animals share the same habitat, each
is tuned to that habitat in its own particular way. A spider is sensitive to the
forces and features of the habitat relevant to its own particular needs. To
truly understand the spider’s lifeworld, we would have to experience that
world the way that a spider does. It is impossible to truly understand an
animal apart from the environment in which that animal evolved and to
whose features its perceptual systems have adapted.
Of course we human animals also occupy our own lifeworlds,
our perceptual bandwidth is not tuned to ultraviolet light like the spiders,
nor do we sense ultrasonic sound like dogs can, our lifeworlds emerge
according to our own particular needs and purposes. This is another way
in which our sensorimotor and perceptual systems extend into, and are
reciprocally conditioned by our lifeworlds; and it is exactly this mutuality
that J.J. Gibson devoted his lifework to elaborating. His ecological model
of perception challenged traditional cognitive theories of perception and
laid the foundation for today’s embedded, embodied, enactive, extended
theories of cognition—his ecological model of perception was the original
“E.”
J.J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Long Grove, Illinois Waveland
Press 1966, p. 101.
5.
Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010, 1.
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that not a single pilot fit within an average range on all 10 dimensions, and
less than 3.5 percent were “average” on only three dimensions.3 Like the
story of Norma before them, they found that not one living breathing pilot
matched the average. But, unlike the Norma study, they did not blame the
actual, living breathing women for not matching the ideal—instead, they
innovated. They designed adjustable hand controls, seats, foot pedals, all
the features that are now standard equipment not only in cockpits, but in
every automobile.
Today, thanks to breakthroughs in the biological sciences we
now have a more refined understanding of the astonishing sensitivity and
connectedness of the human organism than ever before. Not only can
the body not be reduced to a static Platonic form, or crunched into a
norm, the body is inseparable from the environments that we inhabit, and
inextricably bound to the interpersonal, social and cultural relationships
on which our lives depend. Our bodies do not stop at the surface of our
skin. As the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson said five decades ago, “The
surface of an organism, it should be remembered, is actually a boundary
between the organism and its environment, and the boundary is not always
or everywhere as clean-cut as the hairless human philosopher tends to

4.

3.

Todd Rose, The End of Average, New York: Harper Collins, 2016.
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Extended Organisms - Nested Dynamic Systems

The slipperiness of the line between organism and environment
has been importantly elaborated by philosopher Andy Clark, who with
David Chalmers introduced the Extended Mind hypothesis in 1998,
asserting that body/brain/world involve a dynamic system. He argues
his case citing the example of the bluefin tuna (Figure 2.4) who also
treats the environment as an equal partner. According to studies by fluid
dynamicists, the anatomy and musculature of the tuna render it physically
incapable of swimming as fast as it does. Tunas reach their remarkable
speeds by sensing naturally occurring currents, and using their tails to create
additional vortices that propel them faster than their strictly physiological
capabilities alone would allow. Clark writes, “The real ‘swimming machine’
therefore, is not the tuna alone, but the tuna in its ‘proper context’—the
tuna, plus the water, plus the vortices it creates and exploits.”9

J.J. Gibson, Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, New York, Psychology Press, 1979,
127.
7.
J. Scott Turner, The Extended Organism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 2000, 3.

8.

Taking seriously the implications of the co-emergent coupling of
organism and umwelt, leads to some rather startling conclusions. In his
book, The Extended Organism, the physiological ecologist J. Scott Turner
meticulously illustrates how animals exploit the physical properties of their
surroundings to their advantage, posing the deceptively simple question:
“Are animal-built structures properly things external to the animals that
built them, or are they properly parts of the animals themselves?”7 Where
do we draw the line between organism proper and the organisms’ umwelt?
If we choose to draw the line at the envelope of the organism’s body, we
find that this outermost layer is quite permeable, allowing a steady influx
of matter and energy to flow through it. Cut off the flow of energy and
the organism will perish. “It is not the boundary itself that makes the
6.

Figure 2.4: Pacific Bluefin Tuna uses water to propel its body at
amazing speeds. Image courtesy of Randy Wilder from the Monterey
Bay Aquarium

Ibid
Andy Clark, Mindware: An introduction to Cognitive Science, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001, 272.
9.
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organism distinctive,” he writes, “but what that boundary does. In other
words, the boundary is not a thing, but a process.”8 He illustrates how
earthworms manipulate the physical properties of the soil to serve as an
accessory kidney, how mole crickets construct trumpet shaped burrows
that help amplify the sound of their mating calls and how the spectacular
mound nests of African termites not only house the colony, but serve
as gas-exchange systems allowing them to adapt to a wide-range of
environmental conditions—effectively extending their physiology in the
structures they build.

Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of Design

It is interesting that Gibson undertook much of his early work on
perception during his tenure as the director of the Aviation Psychology
Program during the Second World War. His theory of perception as the
active, direct extraction of information from an ambient flow of energy
grew out of his interest in trying to understand how pilots were able to
accomplish skilled flight, which the then prevailing notions of perception
failed explain. The skilled sensorimotor coupling essential to aircraft
flight remained a stirring question to him, and perhaps contributed to his
later introduction of the notion of affordances, the key to understanding
his ecological psychology. Gibson defined an affordance quite broadly
as a possibility for action in the environment that refers “to both the
environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies
the complementarity of the animal and the environment.”6 Affordances
refined and textured Von Uexküll’s umwelt by articulating the concrete
and specific features of the life-world that constrain or afford behavior,
which then leads to modulations and changes to both organism and
environment in a complementarily manner. Returning to our earlier
example, the pilot’s umwelt is detailed and furnished with the tools,
levers, seats and mechanisms complementary to the pilot’s sensorimotor
perceptual systems, the two systems are united via the pilot’s actions
which those details and furnishings enable and allow—understood in
this way affordances serve as the connective tissue between animal and
environment.
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Towards a New Theory of Design

In 1976, Gibson opened his talk at a symposium entitled
“Perception in Architecture” by declaring that, “Architecture and design
do not have a satisfactory theoretical basis. Can an ecological approach to
the psychology of the perception and behavior provide it?” Because this a
rare instance in which Gibson addressed the concerns of architecture most
directly, focusing on and developing these points can be particularly useful
because it is here that Gibson proposed that affordances could provide
a foundation for a reinvigorated theory of design. “The hypothesis that
things have affordances, and that we perceive or learn to perceive them,
is very promising, radical, but not yet elaborated.”12 What would it mean
to elaborate or articulate affordances, and how would that provide a
J.J. Gibson, Ecological Approach, 9.
J.J. Gibson, Reasons for Realism, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Publishers,1982, 413.
12.
J.J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, New York: Houghlin Mifflin1966,
285.
13.
In design the notable contributions have been: Donald Norman, The Design of Everyday
Things, New York: Basic Books, 2002.
14.
In architecture the notable contributions have been: Eric and Ronald Rietveld, www.
raaaf.nl.
10.
11.

J.J. Gibson, 1982, 413.
As quoted by David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, London: Routledge, 1995,
12.
17.
Klee, Paul. Notebooks: Volume 2: The Nature of Nature, London, Lund Humphries, 1973,
269.
18.
J.J. Gibson, 1982, 413.
15.
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sound theoretical foundation for architecture? There has of course been
considerable work done in elaborating affordances in design, cognitive
science, architecture,13 dynamic systems theory14 that we can build upon
in this effort. But for now, let’s take Gibson words directly: “Things will
look as they do because they afford what they do . . . Herein lies the
possibility for a new theory of design. We modify the substances and
surfaces of our environment for the sake of what they will afford, not for
the sake of creating good forms as such, abstract forms, mathematic and
elegant forms, esthetically pleasing forms. The forms of Euclid and his
geometry, abstracted by Plato to the immaterial level, have to be rooted
in substances and surfaces and layouts that constrain locomotion and
permit or prevent our actions.”15 What about this statement constitutes a
new theory of design? First let us clarify what exactly we mean by theory
which derives from the Greek theoria, and shares the same root as theatre.
Theory is rooted in the meaning ‘to view, to make a spectacle, to speculate.”
So, if we take theory to mean a certain view of things and understand
architecture according to Gibson’s way of seeing, that is through the
filter of ecological perception, some basic architectural principles assume
a completely new meaning. To design things for the sake of what they
will afford, not for how they look, but for what they do, would go far
beyond the dictum that form follows function, to imply that form itself is
a verb—form forms. The shape of things, shape our movements, invite or
disclose possibilities—are worn and grooved by the shape of our habits.
Here Gibson intends form in the Aristotelian sense, form not as outward
and fixed, but form as process— “an inner forming activity which is the
cause of the growth of things”16 Or, as Paul Klee put it—“form is the
end, death, form-giving is life.”17
According to Gibson, architects have misunderstood form
because they have been taught form as a graphic exercise, treating form
as a painter would treat form. In this way, “No one is ever going to
understand “form” . . . the use of the term only promotes confusion.”18
Indeed, how many architecture schools still engage in formal exercises—
carving styrofoam solids, and manipulating the cube may have their value
as playful, creative experiments, but they perpetuate the obsolete notion
that the goal of architecture is to dress up and hollow out a Platonic
solid, failing to realize that treating form as an end in itself is, as Klee
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If we understand the structures we build not as inert objects
but as physiological extensions and amplifications of our own capacities,
that is, if our buildings are to us, as the cockpit is to the pilot; we must
consider them in terms of a nested dynamic body/brain/building system.
And, to get at the full import of what Gibson meant by an affordance,
we must understand an affordance as it is positioned—that is nested—
within the context of a dynamic system. The units of measure used in
physics made no sense in Gibson’s terrestrial ecology. “The components
and events of the environment fall into natural units. These units are
nested. They should not be confused with the metric units of space and
time.”10 Gibson consistently referred to affordances in terms of spatial
and temporal nesting—places are nested within other places, events are
nested within other events: “For perception this nesting is what counts,
not the metric dimensions of empty time with its arbitrary instants and
durations. Time as such, like space is not perceived.”11 The relative and
qualitative dimensions of measure are here restored, umwelt and organism
are scaled and tempered according to each other. Gibson’s affordances
provide an alternative to the conceit of a static ideal, to the absolutes of
space and time—affordances are inherently situated, dynamic, relational,
complementary and embodied.

16.

19

Primacy of Movement

Gibson’s ecological model is inherently dynamic, so it is not
surprising that he proclaimed, “Architects need to pay attention to the
affordances of locomotion and action in the layouts they design.” The
long practiced but shortsighted goal to produce “esthetically pleasing
forms” rests on an obsolete understanding of perception, one that
considers the static picture as the rule, rather than an exception—this
is exactly the model that Gibson overturned more than fifty years ago.
Perceiving is active, exploratory and sequential, “We are never frozen in
the moment,” as Gibson insisted, what we see when we look around,
“Is not a patchwork of forms but the possibilities of support, of falling,
of resting, of sitting, of resting . . . of taking shelter.” Similarly, Juhani
Pallasmaa has long advocated for understanding architecture as a verb,
“Its true essence is always an invitation to action. It is this verb-like
tendency towards active search and exploration that unites architecture
and the human mind.”20 His statement echoes Gibson’s insistence on
the exploratory nature of perception, when we move through places
we are searching for, “The possibility of entering the next vista.”21 We
now know that every act of perception is also an act of the imagination,
that the two faculties share an inseparably common ground, and we
are beginning to appreciate the extent to which they are both rooted in
movement. Not only is movement primary to architectural experience,
movement is primordial to thought and feeling. Gibson’s refusal to
relegate the mental and the physical to opposing realms has now found a
wealth of empirical corroboration. Numerous studies have documented
the complementarity between posture and gesture and thought and
feeling. Assuming various poses triggers changes in our endochrine

Figure 2.5: This double image compares the syncopation of Peter
Zumthor’s Serpentine Gallery, 2011, hallway (https://golfatech.
weebly.com/design-studio/archives/01-2015) with the multiple
impression of a walking dancer, presenting the case of how we
actually see ourselves in space (https://www.ted.com/talks/
amy_cuddy_your_body_language_may_shape_who_you_are). In
other words, we see ourselves not in still frames of a photographic moment, but as complete and complex motions moving from
here to there.

Amy Cuddy’s Ted talk: “Your Body Language May Shape Who You Are”
Colin Ellard, Places of the Heart: The Psychogeograohy of Everyday Life, New York: Bellevue
Litrary Press, 2015, 23
24.
Z. Djebbara, L. B. Fich, L. Petrini, K. Gramann, Sensorimotor brain dynamics reflect
architectural affordances. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, 14769–14778 (2019).
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system that match the import of the gesture, striking a Wonder Woman
pose, for example, literally makes us feel more powerful.22 As Colin
Ellard has noted, “We feel because we do.”23 Gesture and posture
have their own complex emotional and chemical signature. Further,
a recent neuroscience experiment indicated that cortical potentials
vary as a function of bodily affordances available in the physical
environment, implying that cognition is intimately related to potential
bodily movements24 (Figure 2.5). Gibson also confirmed that knowledge
unfolds through movement. We learn places by moving through them,
places are disclosed through successive opening of vistas and he
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insisted—death. “What architects are concerned about,” said Gibson, “is
the layout of surfaces.”19 And to consider surfaces in the way that Gibson
intended—that is, trading the word layout for “formal arrangement”,
replacing the noun form with substance, reserving the word form for use
only in its active sense—would be radical indeed. And going a step further,
what if we understood surfaces not for what they are, but for what they
do. Treating surfaces as boundaries that are, like we must now understand
the boundary of our skin, not as things but as processes—surfaces as the
site of intense interactions.

22.

Ibid
20.
Juhani Pallasmaa, Architecture as Experience: The Fusion of the World and the Self, Architectural Research in Finland, Vol. 2, no.1 2018
21.
Gibson, 1982, 416.
19.

23.
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Experiential Space

The metrics of Gibson’s terrestrial ecology were not those
applied in the physical sciences, they were nested units whose values were
always relative, that is, relational. The obstacle to thoroughly applying a
relational understanding to architecture is that we continue to assume
along with classical physics that the universe consists of isolated bodies
in space. Gibson was constantly trying to get us to break this habit,
“What we perceive first of all is not abstract color and space . . . but
surfaces and their layout.” Space is a term that reverberates through

Figure 2.6: A graphic representation of “tactile situation
awareness system.”27

the halls of architecture schools, yet absolute space is an abstraction
borrowed from physics, and like pure form, has little practical value to
an architect. Along with space and form, we architects also idolize light,
but as Gibson insisted, we can never see light itself—we see gradients,
discontinuities in an array of light as it moves through and along surfaces,
substances and their layout. Gibson broke down the architect’s triad of
pet preoccupations: space, form and light into living, breathing human
dimensions.
Gibson, 1982, 416.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of Movement, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1999, 486.
27.
Kelley, A. M., Newman, R. L., Lawson, B. D., & Rupert, A. H. (2014). A materiel
solution to aircraft upset. Proceedings of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, 14 Jan., National Harbor, MD, 9 pages.
25.
26.

Time as Event

And of course we cannot properly understand space without
addressing the problem of time. Indeed, Gibson did not see time or
space as problems per se, but as underdeveloped concepts in need of
reinterpretation in terms of ecological perception: “Perceptual research
needs a program newer than the one formulated in Newton’s Principles and
Bhalla, M., & Proffitt, D. R. (1999). Visual–motor recalibration in geographical slant
perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 25(4),
1076–1096.
29.
Dario Krpan & Simone Schnall. When perception says no to action: Approach cues
make step hills appear even steeper. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55:89-98.
November 2014.
28.
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We now understand space as layered energetic envelopes that
are extensions of our nervous systems, known as peripersonal and
extrapersonal space. Our experience of space is conditioned by our
emotional and somatic states—this again has been confirmed by numerous
studies. We now know that hills seem steeper to a person wearing a
heavy backpack28 and to someone who is hungry or not physcially fit.29
Another amazing example of how we extend into the space around us,
comes again from the world of aviation. Because flying an aircraft relies
almost exclusively on visual perception, many of the problems occur
when atmospheric conditions impair a pilot’s vision. This is another
affirmation of Gibson’s insistence that we do not perceive space, indeed,
without reference points that are scaled to the human perceptual field,
we cannot perform even the most basic tasks, much less fly an airplane.
To address this problem, the U.S. Air Force augmented visual perception
by devising the Tactile Situation Awareness System; which is a full-body
suit pilots wear with “tactile simulators” integrated inside it. (Figure. 2.6)
The garment delivers small puffs of air controlled by complex sensors
that correspond to various flight parameters, the airspeed, the way the
plane is tilting, etc. The pilot feels a puff of air on the side of her body
that corresponds to the direction of the tilt, and adjusts the plane in that
direction to make the puff on her body disappear. The body feels as the
plane moves. Notice how they choose their words carefully—this is not
a garment, but a system that includes situational conditions; velocity,
atmospheric pressure, oncoming threats, the aircraft, the suit, the pilot,
the controls. This system is so effective that even inexperienced pilots can
perform difficult tasks while blindfolded. The space of the aircraft and
the space of the body morph into a shared dance—the connective tissue
between them is the TSAS suit that affords flight.
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insisted that we not only perceive, but proprioceive.25 This reiterates the
philosopher-dancer-biologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s assertion that,
“What is distinctive about thinking in movement is not that the flow of
thought is kinetic, but that thought itself is. It is motional through and
through.”26 Both our most humble and noble capacities are saturated
with movement; it is indeed the very sign of life.
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Figure 2.7: Cover of Desert Works by Rick Joy, Steven Holl, and Juhani Pallasmaa. Courtesy
of our friend Rick Joy

30.
31.

Gibson, 1982, 403.
Ibid, 418.

Ssrah Robinson

humanizing time has very much to do with the manner in which we treat
these surfaces and substances—texture captures light by casting shadows
and seeming to slow down light’s passage, smooth surfaces reflect light in
a blinding glare, a candle’s glow casts the halo that transforms an event
into an occasion. The play of light is time’s humane messenger.

Articulating Affordances

Now that we have updated some longstanding issues in
architecture: understood form as process, affirmed the verb-like,
dynamic nature of architecture, movement as characteristic of thought,
feeling and experience, established the complementarity of organism/
umwelt proportioned in nested units, the extended, plastic nature of our
perceptual systems and the experiential nature of space and time—we can
take a fresh look at Gibson’s claim that affordances offered a basis for a
reinvigorated theory of design. Gibson acknowledged that affordances
were not without their precedents, and explicitly stated that the term is
reminiscent of aufforderungscharakter, a German term Kurt Lewin
coined that has been translated to English as invitation-character (by
J.F.Brown in 1929) and later as valence (by D.K. Adams in 1931) and later
by Gestalt psychologists as demand-character.32 Although he followed a
similar line of theoretical development, Gibson contrasted affordances by
giving them an independent character. Affordances were invariant features
of the environment that did not change as the observer changed—the
edibility of a substance does not depend on the animal’s hunger but
rather offers what it does, because of what it is. “The affordances of
the environment are permanent, although they do refer to animal and are
species-specific. The positive and negative valence of things that change
when the internal state of the observer changes are temporary. The
perception of what something affords should not be confused with the
“coloring” of experience by needs and motives. Tastes and preferences
fluctuate, something that look goods today may look bad tomorrow
but what it actually offers the observer will be the same.”33 Endowing
affordances with this invariant character enabled Gibson to resolve
the subjective-objective duality that plagued the Gestalt psychologists
forty years before him. Possibilities for action exist in the environment
regardless of your mood or fleeting physiological state. On this Gibson
was very clear: “Affordances are invariant combinations of properties of
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Gibson, 1982, 409.
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Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding.”30 This inherited conceptual
framework is unfit to speak of human experience—we need to develop
a vocabulary for understanding time scaled to human perception. We
do not experience abstractions—like space and time—what we do
experience are places and events and both are co-perceived. In terms of
ecological perception, we experience time as change, animate movement
and flow—and he called all such changes, events.31 The notion of empty
time, as if time is somehow a container that must be filled is alien to
human experience. And this idea, again, is based on an outdated division
between mental and physical realms. Our awareness of the environment,
which both persists and changes is simultaneous with our awareness of
our persistent and changing self—our self-awareness and environmental
awareness are complementary, concurrent and interdependent. Awareness
of events therefore seamlessly encompasses psychic and physical
dimensions. Memory and imagination are triggered by and nested in place.
Our memory of an event arises simultaneously with the living context
in which the event took place. What then, does this entail for architects?
Gibson, in his very matter of fact manner, insisted that our concern must
be with surfaces and substances and their layout—I would suggest that
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Atmospheres and Attunement

In order to articulate affordances, due attention must be given
to the nature of atmospheres, as atmospheres and affordances share
critical common ground: “An important fact about the affordances of
the environment is that they are in a sense objective, real, and physical,
unlike values and meanings, which are often supposed to be subjective,
phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance is neither an
objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An
affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective/objective and helps
us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment
and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An
affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.”35
The key overlap between atmospheres and affordances is the manner in
which they both baffle the categories of subject and object and the physical
and psychical and for this reason, both notions have given architects a way
to think beyond the divide. Our language and philosophy have been so
shaped by the dichotomy that any tendency to conflate affordances and
atmospheres, is an indication of the poverty of our alternatives. And it
this poverty, I think that makes it important to articulate and enrich our
vocabulary of alternatives, and for this reason it is helpful to distinguish
between the two.
What if we understand an atmosphere as an irreducible quality
of experience that is neither subjective or objective but a dynamic fusion
of both. Tonino Griffero characterizes atmospheres as quasi-things36 to
acknowledge the way in which atmospheres are “out there” in the world.
I would compare the ontological status of atmospheres to that of color
—Merleau Ponty’s37 paradigmatic example of the way perception works.
Color, like light and sound and mood is immersive, lacks a front and a
Ibid.
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back, does not obey perspective, is multidirectional, multisensorial, cannot
be contained or reduced to its component parts without losing its life.
What if we think of atmosphere as a general term whose manifestations
include light and sound, scent and feeling—all of these are fluid and
permeable and have moving, temporal qualities.
In an affirmation of their undeniably pervasive physical presence,
Griffero has also advanced the notion that atmospheres have affordances.38
Yet, taking Gibson at his word, it seems doubtful that he would have gone
quite so far. Gibson categorized affordances as objects, substances, places,
events, other people, animals, but he clearly stated that affordances, “Are
not phenomenal qualities of subjective experiences (tertiary qualities,
dynamic and physiognomic properties, etc.) I also assume that they
are not the physical properties of things as now conceived by physical
science. Instead, they are ecological, in the sense they are properties of the
environment relative to the animal.”39 This very claim suggests that Gibson
himself did not quite fully overcome the bifurcation of nature40 that the
classical categorization of qualitative properties presupposes. That is, to
overcome the subject-object divide is to overcome the division between
primary and secondary qualities—those physical properties that belong to
things are not ontologically different from the experience of those things.
In order for affordances to fulfill their role as the interdependent tissue
between animal and environment, the properties relative to the animal
cannot be primary or secondary in importance. It would seem then that if
one cannot admit the divisions of primary or secondary properties, one
certainly cannot admit the category of a third—or tertiary qualities.
I would interpret Gibson’s imprecision on the categorization
of properties as evidence of his commitment to the concreteness of
affordances. He wanted to preserve the open character of affordances,
while retaining their physicality, declaring there is no such thing as an
“abstract object.”41 The key criterion that differentiated his affordances
from Gestalt terms like demand and invitation character was that
affordances were invariant—what something afforded was immune
to one’s psychosomatic state. An apple affords edibility, regardless of
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things (properties at the ecological level) taken with reference to a species
or an individual. I now add: with reference to its needs (biological as well
as social) as well as to its action-systems and its anatomy. The affordances
for behavior and the behaving animal are complementary.”34
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Performative Affordances

As opportunities for action, affordances always imply bodily
coupling, they are shapes in the world that shape the body and vice-versa.
Performative affordances are designed with a specific purpose, to evoke
a prescribed response. This does not mean that the affordance will not
perform other unforeseen gestures and responses, but that it is configured
according to a very specific purpose. An outstanding example of an
umwelt with nested performative affordances that work in concert in a
dynamic system is Alvar Aalto’s Paimio Sanatorium—this is a rare example
of a building that was intended to do, rather than being an assemblage of
“esthetically pleasing forms,” yet whose outcome is exceedingly pleasing.
The building was designed for patients recovering from tuberculosis, and
was informed by Aalto’s own personal experience. When Aalto himself
was hospitalized, he realized that hospitals are rarely designed from the
patient’s point of view, who is almost always lying down. Instead at
For Martin Heidegger the verb attunement was critical to his characterization of
Mood, Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh New York: SUNY Press,
1996. 313. 43 Goran Schildt, Alvar Aalto, A Life’s Work--Architecture, Design and Art, Helsinki, Otava Publishing Company, 69.

Figure 2.8: Alvar Aalto’s Paimio Chair, 1932-33. (Public Domain)
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Paimio, “The room design is determined by the depleted strength of the
patient reclining in his bed. The color of the ceiling is chosen for its quiet,
the light sources are outside the patient’s field of vision, the heating is
oriented towards the patient’s feet and the water runs soundlessly from the
taps to make sure that no patient disturbs his neighbor.”43 Windows and
the placement of beds were based on solar considerations and daylighting,
balconies were colorful and located to optimize resting in the sunshine. He
designed communal spaces for interaction, and mutual resting in the sun.
He and his wife Aino carefully designed the furniture, fixtures and door
hardware to afford comfort and aesthetic delight. Because the rooms were
intended to be shared by two people, sinks were designed to be noiseless
so as not to disturb one’s fellow patient, handles were designed to be
easily and silently opened. The iconic Paimio armchair’s sensuous curves
were not designed purely for visual delight, but were shaped according to
the patient’s spine to facilitate easier breathing. Aalto acknowledged the
precedent in Marcel Breuer’s Wassily chair (Figure 2.8), but intentionally
used wood instead of metal because metal conducts heat away from the
body. For this reason, the handrails on the stairs are made of wood, a
material that is porous, because it once too breathed. Being porous, it is
more responsive to the ambient environment. We tend to see this chair in
isolation, as an object, but in their original context, the chairs they were
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whether or not you are hungry or like how it tastes. The apple is colored
red for complex evolutionary motives—red makes it stand out from the
background, evokes erotic desire, excites my nervous system—but is the
color red here an affordance because it makes me want to bite the apple?
First it would seem that in order for something to qualify as affordance it
must pass the invariant test. Second, despite its conceptual inconsistency,
yet respecting Gibson at his word—it cannot be a phenomenal quality—the
color red, then would seem to fail on both accounts. Which is not to say that
red does not modulate my mood or elicit my desire, it just means it cannot
strictly be considered as an affordance. For these reasons, affordances
cannot properly be applied in the context of atmospheres, to do so, would
be to extend Gibson’s radical notion to its breaking point. I would suggest
that a more fitting verb to use to describe the capacity of atmospheres
to do, would be the verb attune,42 as one would tune an instrument, “To
bring into harmony.” Atmospheres can move us powerfully, pervade us
with their certain intangible signature, tune us according to their own
particular harmony or dissonance. For the sake of my aim here, rather
than articulating affordances as features of atmospheres, I suggest that
in the effort to enrich our vocabulary of alternatives to the subject-object
dichotomy it is more helpful to consider atmospheres and affordances
separately (see Figure 4.2 in Dr. James Hamilton’s essay as a reference).
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Affordances can be performative but not deterministic, and when
they are more loosely composed and open-ended, rather than suggest
certain behaviors, their very openness can favor improvisation—I call
these generative affordances, because they generate unforeseen responses.
If the musical instrument was the analogy for a performative affordance,
designed to allow certain sounds yet flexible enough for them to be played
in different ways, the analogy for generative affordances is the surfboard.
The surfboard affords surfing, it is true, but it has also generated many
other sports and subcultures to go along with them. The non-specificity
of the shape affords a certain flow. The film, Dogtown and the Z Boys
documents how on days when the waves were not big enough to surf,
surfers attached wheels to what was essentially a miniature surfboard and
rode around Los Angeles, eventually improvising skateboards to cruise
around inside empty swimming pools. This of course is the origin of
skateboarding, and even today, skateboard parks are designed with the
features that emulate the old lima bean shaped swimming pools with

Figure 2.9: Skateboarder engages his environment in downtown
Minneapolis. Image courtesy of “City of Skate”

concrete rims that populated Los Angeles in the 1970’s. Skateboarding
translated to snow became snowboarding. You could trace all of these
developments back to the open and flowing shape of the board.
The evolution of board sports has changed the topography of
our cities—where one sees a bench, another sees a curvature that could
generate a possible trick. The tool of the board has opened a different way
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Generative Affordances
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arrayed in a communal room, situated in a sun-lit ensemble. Every detail,
the affordances of handles, faucets, sinks, windows, the handrails, the
symphony of chairs in the communal rooms of the patients’ umwelt was
considered with attention to their healing process. Aalto explicitly stated
that his aim for the building to function as a “medical instrument.”44 And
I don’t think he intended instrument in the mechanistic sense, but rather
in the sense of a musical instrument, one that in concert with the human
breath and movement is animated to make music. The building was an
umwelt for healing, outfitted and detailed with affordances to invite and
organize actions, postures and gestures and colored and lit to attune
person and place in a total atmosphere of well-being.
“Affordances do not cause behavior but constrain and afford
45
it.” insisted Gibson, and while he was clear that affordances do not
cause behavior, in the case of performative affordances they can limit the
alternative actions to the extent that they intentionally shape, and therefore
to a large extent favor certain behaviors over other possible alternatives.
Aalto’s medical instrument, like a musical instrument, was designed in a way
to elicit certain sounds and not others, and yet it allowed each player, to mark
the performance with their own personality. Another classic example of a
performative affordance is the layout of the British House of Commons
Chamber, whose destruction provoked Winston Churchill’s memorable
statement, “We shape our buildings and thereafter, they shape us.” After
years of experience working in the parliament chamber he came to deeply
appreciate how the rectangular chamber forced the adversarial parties to
face one another, unlike the semi-circular or horseshoe configurations
commonly used by other governments. When it came time to rebuild the
chamber, they retained not only the configuration, but also its relatively
small size with only 427 seats to accommodate 646 ministers—so that
they could maintain the intimacy and liveliness of their debates. Another
example comes from South Pacific islanders whose leaders meet in a room
with ceilings so low that one cannot stand up inside of them. When people
are angry they stand up and wave their fists, and the low-ceiling prevents
this from happening. The ceiling height constrains behavior so that the
leaders are more likely to resolve disagreements peacefully. Given what we
now know about the correlation between gesture and endochrine levels,
the dominant pose of standing up likely releases testosterone and perhaps
exacerbates aggression levels.
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physical sense.”48 And like Gibson’s understanding of space as place and
time as event, Van Eyck memorably said, “Space has no room and time
has not a moment for man . . . Whatever space and time mean, place and
occasion mean more. For space in the image of man is place, and time in
the image of man is occasion.”49 Both Gibson and VanEyck understood
the power of design to shape everyday life, to structure movements and
even to modulate thought and feeling. Design had its most potent effect
not so much in grand schemes as it did in the intimate topography of
ordinary gestures and movements. “Large structures (infrastructures)
must not only be comprehensible in their own right, they must above
all—this is the crucial point—assist the overall comprehensibility of the
minutely configured intimate fabric which constitutes the immediate
counterform of each and every citizen’s everyday life . . . Each citizen
would thus ‘inhabit’ the entire city in space and time.”50 Van Eyck’s notion
of the counterform illustrates my point about how skateboarders seek out
shapes and contours in the urban fabric that support their movements;
one’s actions, gestures and movements seek out a physical support—a
counterform—and a place that includes and welcomes those movements
is a place one can truly inhabit, one that is affirming, a place in which one
feels like they belong.
The architect’s task, according to Van Eyck was to “provide the
urban ‘interiors’ society needs; the built counterform of its dwindling
identity.”51 And some of his most important built work that embodies this
philosophy are the hundreds of playgrounds that Aldo Van Eyck designed
around Amsterdam after the Second World War. These playgrounds
reinvigorated the empty pockets and sites of demolished buildings, and he
intended for them to, “To become part of the city’s everyday fabric . . . to
respond to the child’s elementary inclinations and movements and activate
his imagination.”52 The playgrounds would accomplish this because they
were, “Conceived of these simple vital things—only then will imaginative
non-abstract constructions and forms be evolved. As long as attention is
directed not to aesthetic effects, but to experience value, archetypal ideas
valid for different parts of the world in varied form will soon ensue.”53
The playgrounds are configurations of simple structures that are openended, in the sense that they invite multiple ways to respond and play
with them, the benches are arranged judiciously so that caretakers could
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of perceiving the environment through the many possible movements it
affords; and those flowing movements seem to seek out contours that will
allow that particular gesture (Figure 2.9). Each topos—the Greek word for
place—suggests movements that go along with it; and, understood in this
way—forms form. It is not just that skateboards move some ways and not
others that causes the skateboarder to favor certain shapes and contours
over others—skateboarding has generated its own subculture—a network
of postures, gestures, linguistic expressions, clothing and attitudes in
rhythm with the flowing movements afforded by the skateboard. Board
sports require loose-fitting clothing that accommodate the movements,
the general outlook is open, experimental and anti-authoritarian and
the role of performance is more akin to dance as an artistic expression
and spectacle, than it is to other athletic performances. The tool of the
skateboard generates behavior as well as a culture and local topography
that supports that behavior. This is yet another illustration that, “We feel
because we do,” or we feel because of how we move, that is, our affective
dispositions are calibrated by our movements, actions and gestures and
those dispositions in turn trigger a cascade of further consequences and
this spectrum of activity is an untapped dimension of design. What and
how we design impacts the way we move, think and feel.
To design things for the sake of the movements, actions and
gestures they will afford, not for how they look—but for what they do,
which is essentially Gibson’s advice for architects resonates uncannily with
the work of Aldo Van Eyck who worked at roughly the same time.46 Like
Gibson’s rejection of Euclidean form for its own sake and insistence on
design as the layout of surfaces—Van Eyck was concerned not so much
with what things look like, but with what things do. Architecture was not
a search for ideal forms, but a configurative discipline whose task was to,
“Get closer to the center of human reality and build its counterform.”
Van Eyck’s47 notion of a counterform illustrates the interactive formative
dialogue between the shapes of things and the way those things shape us.
According to Van Eyck, design elements should be configured to support
the shapes and rituals of everyday life: “A wall, a seat or some steps on
which to repose, talk, wait or watch; a table around which people gather
for an occasion; a balustrade, wall or lamppost against which one can
lean and smoke a pipe, a door that allows one to tarry with dignity. All
these things are not spaces as such but they constitute place in the most
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Figure 2.10: Before Construction of one
of Aldo Van Eyck’s Playground. Image
courtest of an the article “Aldo van
Eyck and the City as Playground” by
Merijn Oudenampsen.

Figure 2.11: After construction of one
of Aldo Van Eyck’s Playground. Image
courtest of an the article “Aldo van
Eyck and the City as Playground” by
Merijn Oudenampsen.

specific, in the sense that it did not suggest a narrow mode of use. Van
Eyck was explicitly against “abstract forms” which uncannily echoes
Gibson’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of “abstract objects” yet
his critics have praised this playground equipment for being so abstract.
Van Eyck was a friend and admirer of Constantin Brancusi, famous for
his genius in distilling the emotionally charged act of something like a
kiss into a powerful sculptural gesture. And like Brancusi, Van Eyck’s aim
was not for abstraction, or reduction—but for distillation; eliminating the
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extraneous in order to create “vital things.” Taking to heart his friend’s
words, “Simplicity is not a goal in art but one reaches simplicity in spite of
oneself, by approaching the real sense of things.”55 Always dimensioned
according to the mutating shape of childrens’ bodies, Van Eyck’s play
structures consisted of repeated elements: sandpits nested within low
walls of varying shapes, steel tubes bent into arches, domes and cones and
stepping stones of differing shapes and heights. “What is perhaps most
striking about Van Eyck’s playgrounds,” as Robert McCarter has noted,
“is that each one is an entirely unique design for a specific site; each one
turns often seemingly irresolvable existing conditions to advantage; each
one uses the same limited set of common elements; each one is clearly
part of a family of forms—and yet the particular arrangement of each
design is never repeated.”56 Like musical compositions and performances,
the playgrounds configured repeating elements in relationship to factors
unique to their situation, their vitality was generated in the relation between
the elements, the pause between the notes.
This attention to the configuration of solid elements in terms of
the dynamics of the relationship generated between them comes forward
most powerfully in the fact that none of the playgrounds were fenced
in. At the time, playgrounds were cordoned off and patrolled to insure
the safety of the children. Van Eyck was able to create the sense of a
protected, magical world without such rigid enforcement. Rather than
playgrounds per se, they more closely resembled furniture arrangements,
with toys for kids and benches for grown-ups. And this is exactly how they
functioned, the lack of a hard boundary, turned the invisible boundary
into a sort of live edge, a porous membrane which contained the young
and old together, as if they were inhabiting a protected precinct much
like a room (Again see Figure 2.11). Certain etiquette developed around
these nodes of activity, a shared code of conduct naturally emerged which
created its own protected circle of behavior. The playground equipment
is obviously a generative affordance, but what about the ambiguous edge
that also generated certain behaviors—is that an affordance, too?
The verb afford is rooted in the word for “to further, forward,
onward,” which has a definite developmental meaning and when used
in reference to things means, “to be capable of yielding,” which speaks
to the flexibility, elasticity and even generosity inchoate in the term
affordance. When understood in this light I would say that the ambiguous
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keep an eye on the children without encroaching on their activities and
they succeeded in becoming part of the urban fabric because they are not
fenced in.
These playgrounds are outstanding architectural examples of
generative affordances, and the great deal of analysis54 (Figure 2.10 and
2.11) that they have since received can help us understand why they have
worked so well and are so beloved. The playground equipment was non-
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through process, how children learn to become self-regulating when given
the opportunity to exercise their limits and receive feedback from their
environment. Yet this can only happen when they have been given “a large
pasture” as the Zen saying goes. As Suzuki says, “Even though you try to
put people under control, it is impossible. You cannot do it. The best way
to control people is to encourage them to be mischievous. Then they will
be in control in a wider sense. To give your sheep or cow a large spacious
meadow is the way to control him. So it is with people: first let them
do what they want, and watch them. This is the best policy. To ignore
them is not good. That is the worst policy. The second worst is trying to
control them. The best one is to watch them, just to watch them, without
trying to control them.”59 Here Suzuki summarizes the elusive, yet very
real potential of generative affordances.
Affordances is a general term, as well as a generous and
generative one, and articulating different ways that affordances function
is not intended to be a pedantic exercise, but rather to stimulate thinking
about the endless ways to engage our bodies and minds in the ecology
of our daily lives. Articulating affordances can take us from abstractions
to actions, from general behavior to specific gestures and can open more
sensitive levels of awareness. When we architects interpret our brief in
terms not of forms, but of potential movements and become aware of
how those movements shape mood, attitude, disposition, memory and
imagination, we engage the soft dimension of human consciousness into
our configurative discipline. Details will speak not only to the trained eye
of our peers, but to the contours and sound of the human hand, the
curvature of the spine that affords breathing, the shape of the basin that
diverts a splash into a cascade, and the rhythm of rocking that animates
the soul of the porch. The circle of play and the bench that makes a
place, the circle of light illumined by the candle that makes an occasion,
the attention paid to these specifics has been the missing link in the
education of an architect concerned with the top down approach that fails
to consider and support the rituals of daily life in pursuit of the abstract
ideal. In the words of Aldo Van Eyck, “Whoever attempts to solve the
riddle of space in the abstract will construct the outline of emptiness and
call it space. Whoever attempts to meet humanity in the abstract will speak
with an echo and call this dialogue. Humans still breathe in and out. When
is architecture going to do the same?60
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edge of the playground is a generative affordance, its ambiguity generates
improvisation, allowing for growth and emergence—the processes of life.
The playground design manifests the import of the Zen master Shunryū
Suzuki’s saying that, if you want to keep your cow close to you, give
her a big pasture.57 Indeed, the absence of an outward restraint causes
one to create an inner boundary—the lack of an outward structure of
control, causes one to generate one’s own with the tools at hand. Yet, we
cannot fully appreciate how a generative affordance functions unless we
understand it in the context of its role in a larger dynamic system. And
while this is not the place to launch into a summary of dynamic systems
theory, for our purposes it is helpful to improvise some of their basic
principles.
A dynamic system is self-organizing; its organization and structure
emerge from diverse elements that interact on multiple levels in nonlinear
and time-sensitive ways. Dynamic systems have an inherent tendency
to create pattern. Behavior and development are constructed through
process according to the organizational principle of soft-assembly.58
Understood as dynamic systems, the very openness of the playgrounds’
layout, the relationship between soft (spatial) and hard (solid) elements,
the non-specificity of the equipment excited the imagination to invite
multiple interpretations. The ambiguous boundary itself generated a living
protective edge because the system self-organizes and has a tendency to
create pattern, and in a sense builds a functional fence where no physical
fence exists. That is, because there is no explicit boundary, caretakers
have to pay more attention to the children to assure they were weren’t
wandering too far, rather than becoming overly engrossed in reading their
newspapers. Without a fence, children can feel free and exercise their own
sense of limits. While at the same time, caretakers have to be present in
the moment—and this presence, this awareness could be considered as an
integral component of the system itself. In this way, the configuration of
objects was a pattern that patterned attention and awareness. The principle
of soft-assembly describes the way development happens through the
multimodal and spontaneous appropriation of the tools at hand; these
tools can be “hard” as in playground equipment, or they can be “soft”
the way that human awareness is soft but no less real or relevant to the
way actions, movements or places and events are organized and come
into being. Soft-assembly describes how development is constructed
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To live in an environment which has to be endured or ignored
rather than enjoyed is to be diminished as a human being.1
				
-Sinclair Gauldie

Figure 3.0: Giulio Romano, 1499–1546, Italian painter and architect, Fresco on
the south wall of Palazzo del Tè. (Public Domain)

Sinclair Gauldie, Architecture: The Appreciation of the Arts (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969), p. 182.
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Although the theme of this talk is the idea of affordance within
the humanities today, I would like first to consider the idea in an economic
sense. Designers have limited time and money to put into the conception
and realization of a building, and the question I would like to pose is on
what exactly should they spend this time? What is the role of the architect
in designing, documenting, and overseeing the project? A score of talented
engineers can now provide nearly all of the technical specifications that
go into a design, and a team of good contractors are capable of building
almost any creation or aberration that the architect may concoct. So, what
role does the architect play?
Some may argue that designers come up with the overarching
“idea” of the design—that is, they provide the framework or what is
sometimes referred to as the “aesthetic” expression of the building’s
functions. Yet this view rings somewhat hollow to me, because it leaves
out many other things. It seems to reduce the designer’s role—if I might
borrow the binary option of the late Robert Venturi—to designing the
wallpaper for the decorated shed, or sculpting the feathered locks of
the duck. Wherein resides this so-called aesthetic idea, in any case? Even
philosophers as deliberate as Immanuel Kant, as we shall see, were unable
to find it. A little more than sixty years ago the great Finnish architect Alvar
Aalto, in a lecture entitled “The Architect’s Dream of Paradise,” offered
what I think is a more gallant and noble response to the question of the
designer’s role, when he noted that “Every building, every architectural
product that is its symbol, is intended to show that we wish to build a
paradise on earth for man.”
Now these are high aspirations, because the notion of paradise is
fecund with both lush images and historical meanings. The lost or future
paradise stands at the core of the Hindu, Buddhist, Judeo-Christian, and
Islamic religions. The Greek word paradeisos, which appears twice in the
Alexandrian translation of the Hebrew bible, comes from the Persian
word paridaeza, which mean an enclosed or walled-off garden. Thus, the
word paradise is most generally associated with the garden.
This is also true with the great rulers of the ancient world. The
famed Hanging Gardens of Babylon, as we now know, were actually
located in the Assyrian city of Nineveh (present-day Mosul), and King
Àshurbanipal went to great lengths to describe not his palace but the gardens
that he had designed. The great imperial cities of China were built around
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Yet how do we save our ship from being pummeled on the rocks
of our own unchallenged design premises? The problem is not an easy one
because of the great complexities of what we now refer to as global culture.

Alvar Aalto, The Architect’s Dream of Paradise, (1957), in Göran Schildt, Alvar Aalto in His
Own Words (Helsinki: Otava Publishing, 1997), p. 215.
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Figure 3.1: Abbaye du Thoronet in Abbey in Le Thoronet, France, 1157. (Public Domain)

But perhaps we should start by admitting that we have, in recent years,
been a little intellectual lazy. After theory crashed and burned sometime
around the start of the new millennium, we have been coasting along a
little too smugly. We continue to view the world in Cartesian dualities,
such as the belief that we have material bodies into which are crammed
the gray matter of thinking minds, or that we are subjects cast within an
objective world somehow standing apart from us, something that we can
manipulate at will. We continue to characterize culture as something out
there in the world, something given and not of our making, something
over which we have little or no control. We continue to ignore the fact that
in the last quarter-century philosophy, the humanities more broadly, and
the biological sciences have undergone a significant paradigm shift—to
borrow a phrase from Thomas Kuhn. It is one that has uprooted many
centuries-old ways of viewing the world. If we wish to start fresh in our
pursuit of Aalto’s paradise, then perhaps the first thing that we do is to
work with an up-to-date understanding of who we are as living organisms.
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the emperor’s palace, which was generally centered within or adjacent to
the imperial garden. The city of Kyoto, the one-time capital of Japan,
exists today as a city defined almost entirely by its imperial and monastic
gardens. Plato and Epicurus gave their lectures in gardens. Hadrian built
his imperial city at Tivoli (for a resident of one) in a vast garden. And the
mesmerizing mosaic depiction of the wide-eyed Empress Theodora in
the church of San Vitale in Ravenna is portrayed inside a garden pavilion.
Early Christian monks who left their towns for the isolation of desert
caves or forest huts alluded to them as paradises. Later in the Middle Ages,
the reform-minded Cistercians referred to the cloisters of their austere
stone abbeys as paradises. Imagine for a moment how indeed paradisiacal
were their churches with their extremely high reverberation times, the aural
spectacle of one hundred monks in a candle-lit midnight mass interlacing
the precisely times phrases of their Gregorian chants (Figure 3.1). They
must have imagined the collective sound as emanating from heaven above.
Does this mean that Aalto was misguided in his hope that
designers could build another paradise?2 Or have we, as designers, lost our
way in the muddy philosophical backwaters of semiotics, postmodernism,
poststructuralism, deconstruction, and computer-generated software—all
of which at least has had the benefit of wringing the last molecule of
life out of a tedious and exhausting line of architectural theory. Like the
Sirens of the Odyssey, theory has lured architects into the belief that the
purpose of design is to play conceptual games or be edgy, as it were,
through the manipulation of society’s cultural emblems. In doing so, we
have overlooked the fact that architecture is predominantly a “whole body”
experience—a multisensory, emotional, hormonal, and phenomenal one
grounded in the entire bodily organism. This experience also arises in the
dynamic interplay of the ecological, social, and cognitive environments. If
design studios have emphasized the need to be creative in a fashionable
display of glass boxes or twisted cutting-edge objects, Aalto’s notion of
paradise was much simpler. He was simply voicing the desire to create an
environment in which people would thrive and be happy.
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There are two crucial points for architects that can be extracted
from this summation. First, we cannot extract the organism from the
environment in which it is embedded; our very existence is bound with
it. Second, because architects build environments, they contribute largely
to the environmental and social cultures in which our lives unfold. A little
over a year ago, a group of European architects and planners at the annual
gathering of world leaders in Davos, Switzerland, issued the proclamation
that we urgently needed a holistic, culture-centered approach to the built
environment. What does such an approach entail? We might start with the
underlying premise of the new biological field of niche construction—
that is, when an organism alters its environmental field, it also changes the
natural-selection pressures of that organism. Saying it another way, every
time we pollute the environmental field with poor objects of our own
design, we demean ourselves as a species.
Three interrelated terms stand in the forefront of the contemporary
humanistic discourse: embodiment, enculturation, and enactivism. To say
that we are embodied organisms by virtue of our bodies borders on a
tautology, yet from a cognitive perspective it is important to clarify one
essential point. Cognition in itself does not exist in the brain somewhere
alone or apart from the body. Every thought, every course of action, every
meaningful affordance is a function of the whole organism. If you at
semester’s end have not slept for three days, your life is diminished and your
compacity for thinking is lessened. Thought is therefore limited, or rather
defined, by the capacities of our bodies. We view the world surrounding us
with human eyes, human ears, human olfaction, human tactile sensibilities,
and human spatial awareness, which differ from the same capacities of
other organisms. A bat or a bee, for example does not see what we see. We
do not function in the same spectrum of light or sound, or in any other
Evan Thompson and Francsico Varela, “Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and
consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 5:10 (October 201), pp. 423-424.
3.
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The nervous system, the body and the environment are highly
structured dynamical systems, coupled to each other on multiple
levels. Because they are so thoroughly enmeshed—biologically,
ecologically and socially—a better conception of brain, body, and
environment would be as mutually embedded systems rather than
as internally and externally located with respect to one another.3

sensory regard. Our social lives are also unique. As one textbook on the
idea of embodiment made the case: “By using the term embodiment we
might highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds
of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor
capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological
and cultural context.”3 If a bee with its sensory system seeks out honey,
we have our own perceptual and organic affectations.
The idea of enculturation or culture is another term whose meaning
has radically shifted in recent years. According to the anthropological
models of the 1960s, culture was simply the “nurture” factor of the nature/
nurture equation—that is, culture was something imposed upon the human
genetic structure from the outside, from the social environment that
humans themselves have created. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz in
the early 1970s, for instance, defined culture as “extragenetic, outside-theskin” control mechanisms, which distinguish the behavior of our species
from other species.4 Contemporary philosophy, however, views culture in
a very different light, as we have seen with Thompson’s characterization
of the brain, body, and environment as dynamically structured systems
mutually embedded. The original meaning of the word “culture,” taking
it back to its Latin root, is growing or cultivating something in the soil
or a prepared medium. The humanities and sciences are today actually
returning us to this meaning. In architectural terms, culture is tending
to the human organism within its built and social environments—the
inseparable environmental and cultural medium in which our particular
organism either thrives or diminishes.
The idea of culture is also related to that of enactivism, which
is the idea that we are not bodies separate from and cognitively assessing
an objective world apart from us. Rather, there is a dynamic interplay
between the two, which cannot be suspended. Our constantly changing
cognitive systems, through each individual and generational change, enacts
or constructs the meaning of what we perceive. Each of us, living in a
cultural medium, enacts a somewhat different world. And our different
experiences, in turn, are a result of the mutual interaction between our
sensorimotor capacities and the environment in which we dwell.
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In part, this new view of ourselves can be summarized by this passage of
the philosophers Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela:
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The other image, admittedly situated in a better climate, has, by
contrast, sunlight, greenery (so important in relaxing the optic nerve),
texture, scale, history, and of the affordance of multiple transportations,
which allows us the healthy exercising of our biological organism (Figure
3.3). Why is it that architects, and even those studying architecture I dare
say, still tend to gravitate toward the so-called solution on the left? It is
because we are focused on the object and not the experience of the urban
inhabitant. Designers are looking for a technological solution rather than
creating a human niche that allows people a set of affordances.

Figure 3.2: Glass building in city context
http://www.soboxdebanheiro.com.br/
vidros-refletivos
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And here we come to the idea of “affordance,” the theme of
this particular seminar. In 1934, the biologist Jakob first approached
the idea with his notion of the Umwelt, the surrounding world, or how
our perception is defined by the sensory carriers of meaning particular
to our organism.6 In 1979 the psychologist James Gibson carried this
notion forward when he defined a “niche”—that which we as architects
are presumed to design—as “a set of affordances.” He also noted that a
“niche” stands apart from the idea of “habitat, because it refers more to
how an animal lives than to where it lives.”7
I will make the case that this distinction between “how we live,”
as opposed to “where we live,” is crucial to a more responsible approach
to design. It is pivotal because it suggests that we should be focusing less
on what a building means to the occupant or to the designer (for the latter,
usually a reaffirmation of the latest fashions), and more on how people
experience them. Take these two somewhat random images.
One is the almost prototypical American urban street: little direct
sunlight within the canyons of the tall buildings, concrete sidewalks, glass
boxes with no detailing—in short, a cold, boring, and lifeless design offering
no sensory spark or engagement. Various studies have shown that people
pick up their pace when walking past such buildings, in order to move away
from them as quickly as possible (Figure 3.2). Unfortunately, the glass box
adjacent to it typically provides only more of the same. The American
anthropologist Edward T. Hall, back in the 1960s, made the observation
that the failing of modern architecture was precisely its lack of scale
and tactile stimulation. As he described the problem: “Our urban spaces
provide little excitement or visual variation and virtually no opportunity
to build a kinesthetic repertoire of spatial experiences. It would appear
that many people are kinesthetically deprived and even cramped.”8 This
statement was made fifty-three years ago, and yet we seem content with
making the same mistake. Perhaps an even more embarrassing question is
why are we content with designing with the architectural palette of a halfcentury ago?

Figure 3.3: Stanford University’s masonry
campus in Stanford, California
https://www.jeduka.com/usa/catamarca/
stanford/stanford-university

We can see this same problem in other ways. Television studios
across the country are always set up with a view of their city’s skyline,
or an image of it, in the background. People living in cities, for some
odd reason, seem to take pride in their city’s skyline. This was in part the
thinking behind the decision of London politicians, just a few decades
ago, when they decided to allow high rises within the downtown areas—
much to the chagrin of Prince Albert and Christopher Wren. And note,
incidentally, the absence of trees in those newly renovated zones. This is
an image that appeared in the English journal Reaction, which carried the
headline “Why are London’s skyscrapers so ugly?” Thinking of a city from
the perspective of a helicopter, London politicians and planners wanted to
have their city be seen as an international hub of commerce and banking.
And here we have all of architecture’s elite designers participating. Yet at
the same time, there is a price to pay for this preening exercise, which is
the destruction of much of the city’s historic scale and stately fabric, nodal

Just What Can Architects Afford?

III.

45

IV.
Just what can designers afford? Andy Clark defines affordance this way:
“Affordances are the possibilities for use, intervention and action which
the physical world offers a given agent and are determined by the ‘fit’
between the agent’s physical structure, capacities and skills and the actionrelated properties of the environment itself.”9 I like in particular the idea of
a “fit” between the human organism and “action-related” qualities of the

Andy Clark, “An embodied cognitive science,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3:9 (September
1999), p. 346.
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environment. And because one perceives the built environment through
one’s sensory and emotional engagement with it, the architect’s task would
seem to be creating environments that are intriguing or compelling in some
manner, environments that are adaptive to our organisms, environments
that are restorative or restive, or more simply, environments that make
us happy. Conversely, people shun environments that are dangerous,
annoying, tedious, and injurious to their health.
Yet because we, as a society, seem unable to repair the impoverished
or dilapidated parts of our cities, or maintain our dark and filthy masstransit stations where we are jammed into overcrowded trains, or relieve
our suburban commuters of their two hours of bumper-to-bumper travel
on so-called expressways—we run up against the difficult question of
what can architects really afford? Can we really think of changing the
patterns that have been set down over generations, as it were? Can we any
longer contemplate, as Aalto once did, a vision of something different? In
what way can we realistically provide a better “fit” or attunement of the
human organism with the action-related prospects of its surroundings?
Although there may be no timely or inexpensive solutions to
the many failings of our present environments, we can at least start by
reforming our profession, and in this regard, I would like to begin with a
radical reform of architectural education. For a start, I would like to see
significantly less studio time devoted to coming up with the “idea” for a
design, or how we might ape the latest trends in our glass boxes, and more
on research into the human experience of designed environments—that
is, serious research funded by federal agencies such as the National Science
Foundation or National Institute of Health, or private foundations. It
should be research carried out with the very sophisticated technologies
we have at our disposal today to evaluate better how we engage with our
environments. In the 1960s the Green Movement first articulated our
shortcomings with regard to the impact our poor designs were having on
our natural environments. Today it is time to address the equally pernicious
effects our designed environments are having on us—how we think and
how we socially engage with each other. Some may argue that this time
spent on research will lessen our skill as designers and thwart creativity,
yet I believe the opposite to be the case. Architecture students are very
smart and can handle both tasks, and school is a time for learning and
not to suffer an indoctrination into the unwritten rules of the profession.
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points of high congestion, and shadowed streets on which many people
walk past these glass boxes in a very unhappy frame of mind. Parisians,
living within a different cultural niche, interestingly still restrict their high
rises to the outskirts of the city.
I once lived in Chicago, and from the 35th street station on the
Red Line, one can look north to the impressive skyline of Chicago. People
commuting into the city on freeways from the west also view the skyline as
they are arriving, no doubt with some pride or sense of self-importance.
Yet over many months of the year, people walking those downtown
streets do so with little joy. The cardinal grid channels the howling winter
winds into the glass-and-concrete canyons at great intensity. Trash litters
the sidewalks. The ambient noise level of the overhead mass-transit
system and the horns of the automobiles are only slightly less disturbing
than standing at the end of a runway at O’Hare Airport. The air is fowl,
and the tens of thousands of commuters emerging from their parking
garages or bleak subway stations, twice a day, have to endure this hellish
experience of walking to or from their offices--where, if their desk is
less than twenty feet from the window walls, they will shiver away their
body heat all day long. I think my point is now rather obvious. Architects
radiate a distinct glow when asked by fawning critics to expound upon the
inspiration behind their glass towers, aesthetically fashioned with the latest
twists and bends. Yet the experience of the residents negotiating the city
on a daily basis is more often than not a hellish one—even if their iPhones
can direct them to the nearest pub or pizza parlor. How did we come to
this present state of affairs? Why do we employ such vacuous standards in
our designs? There is a line from a Clint Eastwood movie that pretty much
explains it: “We became civilized.” The legacy of these dumb glass boxes
plopped in every city across the globe will nevertheless remain with us for
quite a while. Whatever happened to Aalto’s dream of paradise?
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Figure 3.4: Swiss Farmhouse, the inherent sense of relaxation of a natural environment.
Image courtesy of Harry Francis Mallgrave.

important about ourselves, but, as it turned out, it also had a profound
effect on the design of hospitals, which today are being designed and built
around gardens, which I, following the ancient Persians, will call paradises.
It also opened a new realm of design thinking—biophilic design—or the
integration of nature into all of our designs. Think of this the next time
you design a building with a view of a brick wall, or worse, a parking lot.
We have many other areas in which research is needed today.
Ulrich’s study of hospital rooms concerned the homeostatic regulation of
the body within the built environment, through the medium of evidencebased design. Yet with the same techniques we can study the effects of
poor environments, or what might be called environmental deprivation.
They are many, well-documented studies of the negative effects of
such environments, among them, obesity, disease, depression, stress,
crime, drug addiction, alcoholism, asocial behavior, psychological and
personality disorders, and higher rations of morbidity. We have known
these problems for years, yet we as a society seem to be incapable of
improving our poor urban environments—helpless as we seemingly are.
Conversely, we have done virtually no research on what constitutes good
or enriched environments, although studies with rats have shown that
sensory and socially enriched environments can double the size of brain
cells and greatly enhances synaptic connectivity. Does this mean that good
environments can make us smarter?

Robert Ulrich, “View through a Window May Influence Recovery from Surgery,”
Science 224 (April 27, 1984), pp. 420-21.
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Understanding better who we are and our intensely social natures will
open up fresh and creative approaches to the design of our cultural
niches. Moreover, without such documentation, architects will never have
credibility with zoning boards, planning commissions, or the heavy arm of
the ever-expanding and oppressive political state. We should reinforce the
point that our ultimate objective is good design, or even better, beautiful
design. And in considering design from a human perspective, we will put
an end to the intellectual fashions that seem perpetually to plague the field
of design.
Now what kinds of research do I mean? The range can be quite
extensive but let me give you a couple of examples. You are a mostly
young audience, who have not entered into the tedium of the workforce,
and therefore you have not yet been forced to come to terms with the
idea of a precious two or three-week vacation each year, where people
go fishing, rent a cabin in the mountains, visit a foreign country, or stay
at a seashore resort. Now why do people feel the need to do such things?
We of course have the appropriate technological metaphor for needing
such a thing; we say we do so to recharge our batteries. We mean by this
that we need periodically a place to relax, to relieve our anxieties and
tensions, to take in new sensory stimulation, and forget the fact that we
are nine thousand dollars in debt on our credit cards. Yet we are also
saying something else when we take on these annual treks. We are saying
that beaches, golf courses, mountains, or a trip to a foreign country are in
their own way paradises, which are remote from our everyday designed or
built environments. The more dismal our local urban environments are,
the more these trips are necessary to maintain biological equilibrium and
good health.
Yet these trips also tell us something else, which can inform our
everyday environments. A few decades ago the psychologist Roger Ulrich
looked at the recovery rates of patients after a surgical procedure that
on average required six days in the hospital. He looked at patients in a
hospital wing that had two different outside views. One part of the wing
faced a brick wall; the other part of the wing opened onto a green meadow.
He discovered that the view of nature, in and of itself, has a restorative
effect on the human body. Those patients with a view of the meadow
stayed in the hospital one day less, had few complications after surgery,
and took fewer pain medications.10 This study not only told us something
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The idea of emotion and mood actually has had a lengthy pedigree
in architectural discussions going back through architectural history—
that is, before the advent of the modern movement short-circuited it.
Aestheticians of the 19th century also seem to have had a good grasp
of mood and perception, matched only by what we have learned in
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the past few decades. Both Robert Vischer and Heinrich Wölfflin, for
instance, argued that the experience of architecture was emotional and
physiognomic—a process by which we feel ourselves into and understand
the world around us. August Schmarsow made precisely the same argument
with architectural space—that is, spatial perception is not a neutral or
Euclidean field but something that changes with the position, orientation,
and affordances of our bodies.11
Traditional psychology textbooks of just a few decades ago
defined mood or emotion as a response of an organism a sensory stimulus,
the way we typically think of emotions such as love or anger. Present
models, however, view mood in a much more complex way. For many
within the field of affective psychology, mood is defined as an ongoing,
endogenous kinesthetic activity onto itself, the predisposed movement
of an organism within an environmental field. Mood is not something
that rises up from some mysterious place below; rather, it is a “wholeorganism” event motivating our movements and actions. If we walk
into a social environment of other people, for example, we immediately
understand the mood of the room. If we walk into a boring architectural
environment, our first impulse is to leave or tune it out.
Just as the appearance of a morning sun seems to brighten the
prospects for our day, or a drizzling rain seems to dampen it, so does
every architectural environment alter our mood or way of thinking. Upon
entering a room in a northern climate, for instance, we might instinctively
move toward a sunny window, both to enjoy the warming heat of the
sun and to rest our eyes if there is a pleasant view of paradise outside.
Again, if it is spring and the window is open, we might enjoy a whiff
of a fragrance emanating from a garden, without being aware that this
sensory experience in itself puts us into an amiable state of mind. Please
note that inoperable windows do not allow this affordance. Maxime
Sheets-Johnstone has emphasized that “affective feelings and tactilekinesthetic feelings are experientially intertwined.” Mood is already “a
postural attitude” or “corporeal readiness to act.”12 We might then think
of the open window as more than just sunlight or view of a garden; it is
an affordance that swells our mood, perhaps with memories. Giovanna
Colombetti argues that emotion pervades cognition through and through,
and thus emotion “is integral to both perception and action.”13
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We also have another way of thinking how we engage or
experience the built environment, which revolves around our sensory
systems. We have proprioceptive, kinesthetic, sensorimotor, and mirror
systems; emotional, visceral, and hormonal systems; visual, auditory, and
olfactory systems; and then there is the breakthroughs in how we engage
with form and space. The discovery of mirror systems in the 1990s, for
instance, will in the future have profound implications for the field of
architectural design. Through a process that has been called embodied
simulation, mirror systems in the premotor and parietal areas of the brain,
for example, allow us to simulate not only the actions and intentions
of others but also the physical characteristic of the environment, such
as the perception of form, space, light, scale, color, texture, materials,
among other features. Where are these topics within your design-studio
curriculum?
A third area in which we, over the past few decades, have made
important progress about ourselves is the recognition of how profoundly
we are social animals. Only very few architects, such as Christopher
Alexander, have wandered into this terrain, and he did so with only
modest and sometimes questionable social-science models. Today we
have made major advances into understanding the parts of the social brain
allowing us to network with others, the environmental factors imperative
for the full development of the social brain, our much longer evolutionary
history, and the ubiquity of human rituals, which lie at the foundation of
our behavior. Once again, I ask the question: Where is this topic within
your design-studio curriculum?
There is far too much here to discuss today, so I will limit myself
two areas of interest to architects. One is the role that emotion or mood
plays in the experience of a designed environment. The second is the
seemingly quaint idea of beauty, which I will obviously not be discussing
by the standards of architectural design juries.

12.
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Figure 3.5: Can Lis by architect Jorn Utzon in Mallorca Spain, 1971. Image courtesy of The
Utzon Foundation

power or through its utmost simplicity: the social anticipation of
conversational seating, exposed stonework, and a sublime Mediterranean
view exploited with a deep perspectival frame (Figure 3.5). Robert Adam
was another master of mood, someone who could dramatically alter one’s
mood from one room to another. Can one think of a more compelling
artistic production than his library at Kenwood, Hamptead, London.
Another master of mood was Henri Labrouste in this design
for the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, now unfortunately retired for
its original purpose. Once again, a festive mood was exploited with the
books, the paradisiacal gardens depicted in the murals, and the porcelain
umbrellas filtering natural light for reading. Not to be overlooked in this
regard was the tactile sensation of the infill panels of the desktops—
glare-free and a soft, perfectly muted surfaces for the requisite lead writing
instrument. What could be more paradisiacal for the work of the scholar.
Architects of the 18th and 19th century knew how to exploit mood in
subtle ways that many designers have since forgotten. The library at Mount
Angel Abbey in Oregon, is approached from a courtyard paradise on the
entrance side, but the reading room is situated on a hilltop to survey an
agricultural landscape interrupted by treescapes along rivers and streams.
Aalto, it seems, viewed buildings as experiences.
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Architects can exploit this connection. We can design spaces that
are permeable, or offering different courses of action. We can modulate
these spaces through the play of light, scale, color, texture, relation,
materiality, movement, sound, olfaction, and the depth of layering effect
upon effect. A long and indirect approach to a building or a narrow path
into an expansive room—both build a mood of anticipation or arousal,
thereby intensifying the hopeful emotion of delight upon one’s arrival.
Similarly, beautifully crafted detailing also pleases everyone. Why? Because
with our mirror systems we emulate the talent or hand-crafted effort that
went into the ingenious result.
Mood also varies with the experience of atmospheric and
conceptual effects. For instance, in medieval France there was a 12thcentury movement called Marianism, a Christian fondness for the
Madonna, which resulted in a bevy of Gothic churches dedicated to
“Our Lady” or Notre Dame. Why was this the case? One reason was
that Christian theology up to this time had been emphasizing the idea of
the Last Judgment, the possibility of fiery and eternal damnation. Mary,
with her head slightly tilted to the right, thus came to be seen a merciful
intercessor on one’s behalf, someone more empathetic and approachable.
Thus, this stained-glass window of Mary in the chancel of Chartres
Cathedral, one of the original windows of the 12th-century church (later
rebuilt after the fire of 1194), is a masterpiece of color and light, because
it fosters the mood of hope and salvation. It did so with the demeanor
of the Madonna, but also with the seemingly supernatural nature of light
filtering through, which was entirely fitting for a building that medieval
architects viewed as the doorway to paradise, if not paradise itself. Aalto
no doubt applauded the efforts of this master craftsman of glass.
Mood can be manifested in many other ways. Hans Scharoum’s
Berlin Philharmonic Hall, despite its cosmopolitan location, evokes
the spirit of a small town’s music festival. Not only does the tent-like
ceiling project the festive mood of a special holiday and its provisional
structure, but the stepped tiers on all sides afford one to experience not
only the orchestra and its powerful auditory vibrations but also the view
of another’s response to what you are experiencing. Scharoum’s building
is thus intensely social in its mood.
Not all emotional experiences, however, have to be so intense
or expressive. Jørn Utzon’s own house in Mallorca achieves its emotional
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someone stands before this particular mural in the church of San Vitale in
Ravenna, one is immediately attracted to the colorful mosaics, but upon
further study one is also drawn into the enlarged eyes of the people within
the retinue of Empress Theodora. These are eyes into which we read the
souls of people who lived almost seventeen hundred years ago. Art history
books may refer to this particular mural as iconographic, but art historians
often miss the point. This mural is paradisiacal because it is deeply social
in its bearing. We say it is beautiful because it tells us something profound
about ourselves.

Harry Francis Mallgrave

Let us turn to the idea of beauty, and in an unconventional
way. Architects typically do not like to speak of beauty, yet they do talk,
sometimes endlessly, about the aesthetic inspiration underlying their
designs. And in this regard, we already have a level of corruption creeping
into practice. The English word aesthetic comes from the Greek word
Aisthētikos, which has the meaning of “perception, feeling, or sensible
cognition.” In this regard, its meaning is grounded not in reflection or
judgment but in the sensory or corporeal senses. Alexander Baumgarten,
who first plucked the word from the past and introduced it into the
German language in the 1750s, understood this very well. He emphasized
its emotional coloration by defining aesthetics as the “science of sensible
cognition.”14
Problems became apparent a few years later, however, when a host
of philosophers debated whether the judgment of beauty was objective
or subjective, whether it resided in the outlines or contours of the artistic
form, or in the mind of the viewing subject. In almost all cases, the idea of
beauty was bound with the idea of making a judgment. Immanuel Kant,
in his Critique of Judgment, considered the issue of beauty and went to great
lengths to preclude the idea of “feeling” or “emotion” from the act of
judgment. At one point, as we suggested earlier, he even proffered the
ghostly notion of “aesthetic ideas”—that is, conceptual ideas involving
the imagination without any “definite concept.” Yet only a few pages
later, he flatly contradicted himself by invoking the philosopher Epicurus,
who had insisted that all aesthetic “pleasures, at heart, issue from a bodily
sensation.”15 Kant’s reasoning aside, this 18th-century fascination with
“judgments” of taste or beauty has kept Western thought in its lurch until
the present day. Conceptual art is but one manifestation of this disease,
which unfortunately seems to have no expiration date.
Yet the idea of affordance, which involves the “fit” between
the human organism and the sensory or action-related qualities of the
environment, allows us to approach the idea of beauty in a different
way. When people outside of the arts say that their lover is beautiful
or that this artistic work is aesthetically satisfying, they are not making
a conceptual statement. They are referring to a sensory impression, one
that fits with the action-related qualities of their immediate environments,
and one whose intense feeling they have a genuine desire to express. When

Figure 3.7: Primavera, Sandro Botticelli, 1482. (Public Domain)

As another example, let us take the painting Primavera by Sandro
Botticelli, a work of the early Italian Renaissance (Figure 3.6). He was
closely associated with the Medici family in Florence, one of whom seems
to have commissioned the work for a wedding. Once again, art history
textbooks devote nearly all discussion to its iconography. The title of
the painting, Primavera, of course, refers to the season of spring, and the
rounded bellies of most of the ladies portray the ripeness of the new
season. The male figure of Zephyrus on the right, who represents the
cooler winds of winter, is about to kidnap the nymph Chloris, whom he
will wed and transform into the goddess of spring, Flora, who (after her
transformation) is the woman in the floral gown scattering rosebuds on
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Poliphilo must wander to find his true love Polia. He eventually weds her
at the altar of Venus on the island of Cytherea. The interesting thing about
this novel, written in the spirit of troubadours, is that while the author
devotes much time to describing the ravishing beauty of the nymph Polia,
he spends an equal, if not greater amount of time, describing the various
gardens he visits as well as the architecture that he discovers. This has led
at least one architect, Alberto Pérez-Gómez, to argue that architecture
originates in a similar erotic impulse. I do not contest him in this belief.16
In fact it might be a way to think of design once again in paradisiacal
terms.
The point of my foray into the world of art is twofold. First, I
believe the profession has today succumbed to what Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno once referred to as the “culture industry.”17 We are
being forced into a dreary cultural conformity of Big Brother’s making,
where the same “art objects” are being restyled or repackaged each new
season. The city of Arles or the Philadelphia Museum of Art does not
need another museum or addition by Frank Gehry to mark its cultural
niche. To put it more simply—in focusing on buildings and objects and
not on the environment field in which we dwell, our priorities are wrong. I
believe that we need to turn our present thinking around, because Aalto’s
dream of paradise, like it or not, is deeply imprinted within our encultured
natures. Every social compact disassembles when people are unable to
work within or enjoy their living environments.
Second, a viable culture of beauty has to be built on a solid
social foundation. The current research on our mirror systems, for
instance, is today demonstrating that we have a neurological resonance
with the intentions and feelings of others, and “these other-within-self
intersubjective representations,” as Jaak Panksepp and Colwyn Trevarthen
explain the matter, “establish sympathetic resonances, and intersubjective
contagions, probably by intrinsic affective systems situated much lower
than the neocortex, making complementary adjustments to the intelligence
and feelings expressed in gestures of other bodies and sensed by sight,
sound and touch through neocortical processes that are epigenetically
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the ground. Mercury stands at the far left. He was the god of medicine and
is therefore another allusion to the Medicis. To his left are the three graces
of pleasure, chastity, and beauty, and it is the middle figure chastity, with
the trim figure, who is about to be nabbed by the arrow of Eros. Even the
fact that the painting takes place in an orange grove is representational,
because oranges were depicted on the Medici coat of arms.
It is when we come the haloed figure in the center—Venus, the
goddess of love—that we realize something else is going on here. The
intense sexual overtones of the figures surrounding her are there to induce
a particular passion, a lustful feeling for love, yet Venus stands apart. The
gesticulation of her right hand is a pose that many early Renaissance
painters chose for the Madonna in the Annunciation, and the head tilt
to the right and the facial structure of Venus is nearly identical to that of
Mary we saw in the Chartres Cathedral. We have here a very interesting
passage between two cultures: the high morality of Christianity and the
more carnal or pagan underpinnings of the new Humanism taking hold—
and not without its peril to the career of Botticelli himself.
We can see this also in Botticelli’s painting of a few years later,
The Birth of Venus, also commissioned for a wedding celebration. A few
of the earlier figures reappear, but here the deity born in the clam shell off
the isle of Cytherea, which incidentally was always portrayed in mythology
as a garden paradise, is given center stage. In her full nudity, we have a
more human and sensuous figure, yet once again she has the head tilt
and the somewhat Gothic appearance of the Madonna. My point is that
both paintings by Botticelli are social expressions in their subject matter,
expressions that we experience not through words but through our own
social and emotional natures. And it is no mystery why these two works
remain widely recognized as beautiful today. Although executed within
a distant and somewhat remote culture of the past, they retain their
emotional power because of the rich social expression they so elegantly
convey. From the perspective of an affordance, we can say they perfectly
define the “fit” between the human organism and the sensory or “actionrelated” qualities of the social environment in which we too, in our own
way, are living.
It is certainly no coincidence that both paintings were completed
during the time that another Renaissance writer was completing his erotic
novel Hypnerotomachia Poliphili, set in a series of gardens, through which
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Figure 3.7: The courtyard of Louis Kahn’s Salk Institutue (1972) gathers the ANFA
congregation to await the equinox sunset aligning with the central water trough. Here
architecture frames events of human life. (image by author).
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programed by experience.”18 The gist of this statement is that we are
deeply connected to each other socially or culturally, although the drift of
society today seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
Joseph Rykwert, back in the era of Robert Venturi’s fascination
with the Las Vegas, warned architects not to succumb to “the techniques
of advertising and the nightjoys of neon,” but rather attend to the physical
form itself, “the stage on which the action occurs, in his words,” the
“demarcation of a place as a social situation”19 (Figure 3.7). The task of
good designers, he went on to say, is “to clarify, to reconcile, to fortify,”
and “the savant exercise of their skill is the real contribution which they
can make to the creation of a valid human environment.” Hans-Georg
Gadamer has similarly argued that every genuine work of art “signifies
an increase of being” or “sensuous abundance,” and when embodied
in rituals or festivals, it brings people together in a swelling moment of
conciliation.20
Seen in this light, the search for beauty is nothing less than a
moral and professional obligation. Beauty and the architectural making
of culture are, in the end, forms of ritualistic behavior. And examples of
human action free of this ceremonial instinct, as Wendy James has noted,
“are impossible to find, because all human action relates in some way to
arenas of culturally specified significance we participate in with others.”21
Beauty and culture are in their own way social activities underlying Aalto’s
vision of paradise. Both are similarly affordances—those which allow us a
moment of fit and fullness, and those which the designer should have the
calling to create.
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The afforances of the encironment are what it offers the animals, what it provides or
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb “to afford” is found in the dictionary, but
the noun “affordance” is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to
both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies
the complementarity of the animal and the environment.
-J.J.Gibson

Here is the plan. In the first section, I will present the two problems
I think we need to solve in order to make good on the conference title.
And I will also make a brief excursion into evolutionary theory. In §2, I
will discuss Gibson’s notion of affordances and some of his claims about
understanding the meaning of what we perceive. In §3, I will discuss the
notion of functions as it applies to biology and those artifact kinds we call
“works of art;” and then discuss what the notion of function suggests
about understanding the meanings of works of art. And, in §4, I will draw
some conclusions about whether our problems are tractable.
But first, a word about some terms: In this presentation I will use the
following terms: “design,” “designer,” “maker,” “product,” and “user.”
For some of you this usage will be jarring. I mean them as you would apply
them to those who design, make, and use video games. But, if you prefer,
whenever you hear “design” think plan, program, or parti, or whatever term
you prefer to suggest the thing you dream up (plans and drawings, for example)
that you plan for someone to make. And, so, if you do that, whenever I
use the term “product” think either whatever it is you subsequently present to
clients or whatever you cause to be built. And, so, then whenever I use the term
“user” think client and whenever I use the term “maker” think contracter
or coder, and when I use “designer” think architect, engineer, product designer,
graphic designer, game designer, or the like. I mean this comment to suggest
some other ways you might take the terms I will use.

1.a. The problems

Figure 4.0: Dr. James R. Hamilton, screen capture from presentation
in March 2019 at the “Affordance and the Potential for Architecture”
symposium. An Interface/ANFA event at Kansas State University.

Recently, a speaker at a presentation at Kansas State University
flipped a switch on the wall behind her in order to get more light into front
half of the room in which she was speaking. Unfortunately, she flipped
the wrong switch, and the half of the room she wanted to illuminate
was still in darkness. Yet, by design, each of the two switches on that wall
afforded some illumination of the room.
This case illustrates both of the questions I wish to address today,
namely: (1) On behalf of users, those who would appreciate a product
(for example, a building or a design element) — how do you come to
have very high credences that a particular thing, or aspect of it, is useable
in some particular way if, in advance, you were not told to expect that it
is? And (2) – on behalf of designers (for example, product designers or
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Figure 4.1: Bank electrical switches on a lecture room wall. But how
does the user know which switch provides the desired function? (image
courtesy of author).

research information in design practice,” and, on the other, there is the
issue of “educating students how to understand the complexity of user’s
perspectives in their design thinking” (Tvedebrink and Jelic, 2018: 7). The
second of these can easily mislead someone if they are already prone to
think that user appreciation is purely aesthetic or sense-based. And, while I
will not discuss this here, the distinction between our aesthetic preferences
and our artistic verdictive judgments is both large and complex. Be that
as it may, the first task, that of “translating user-research information in
design practice,” directly confronts the problem regarding when and how
to talk about purposes. And that issue is even further complicated by the
fact that it only looks amenable to metaphysical solution, whereas it is
clearly an epistemic matter. (See Schrijver and August 2017, 1; and, for a
characterization of metaphysics, see Fine 2017, 98-101.)

In the natural context, no purpose is responsible for any change
in any biological factor; and presumably, when we enter into the “nonnatural” context, factor changes are often the result of genuinely intelligent
design: that is, for example, in breeding dogs, cats, seeds. This brings out
the fact that the only purposes that can be discovered are those responsible
either for artifacts or for entities that are deliberately manipulated in the
manner in which artifacts are.1 I mention this in part because it is basic to
our understanding today that we are concerned with artifacts. Buildings
and elements of design, product designs, bits of furniture, avatars, signage,
indeed, all these “architectural” or “design” objects are artifacts.
The importance of this comes out by thinking a bit more about
Darwin. In a 1986 review of Richard Dawkin’s The Blind Watchmaker, the
philosopher and historian of biology, Michael T. Ghiselin remarked that
Darwin succeeded in replying to Paley in part by showing that natural
selection could achieve in small steps, over geological time, what Paley
assumed could only be the “contrivance” of “a contriver.”2 The other
part of his reply was that Darwin “turned the argument from design on
its head: Nature produces what we might call contraptions rather than
contrivances. In other words, natural selection predicts both adaptation and
maladaptation.” It is not too big a leap, nor disrespectful, to remark that
design by makers does the same thing: it predicts, or at least yields, both
adaptations and maladaptations, if I may call them that, to our needs.3 But
this also highlights the fact that, the fact they are adapted or maladapted is
not, by itself, enough to ascribe purposes to their being the way that they
are. We will come back to this.

2. Affordances with a brief note about two views on the
strategies of neuroscience

We could of course set competing accounts of how to do
neuroscience side-by-side and see what we think, based on our intuitions.
But this runs the “risk that [the discussion] will decay into the dull thud
of conflicting intuitions” (Bigelow and Pargetter, 1987: 196). Such a

I am neither assuming that only human beings make artifacts nor that dogs, cats, and
other non-human animals cannot be artifacts (see Sperber 2007).
2.
Gheselin comments that Dawkins “succeeds admirably in showing how natural selection allows biologists to dispense with such notions as purpose and design”.
3.
Even with respect to artifacts is it not plausible to describe all changes as the result of
aiming at some purpose or even as the result of having achieved a purpose; otherwise,
for example, there would be no unintended consequences of our actions.
1.
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1.b. A not entirely unrelated side trip into evolutionary theory
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architects) and perhaps makers — what data would you need to encounter
to increase your credence that you could either use some “contraption” in
the way it has evolved or design some contraption so that it can be used
the way you intend it to be used?
Our two questions are epistemically related: for the data a maker
or designer would need to encounter to increase her credence that she
could either use some contraption, design one, or create one to fit users’
needs requires those needs first be understood. In addition, for a variety
of reasons teachers of designers and makers must think about this relation
and pay attention to the fact that the second half of it is further divided
into two parts: on the one hand, there is “the issue of translating user-

63

The “affordances” of the environment are what it “offers” the animal,
what it “provides” or “furnishes,” either for good or ill. The verb
to “afford” is found in the dictionary, but the noun “affordance” is
not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both
the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does.
It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment
(Gibson 1979/2015, 119; emphases in original).6

If it is treated as an entrée into the metaphysical debate about the nature of perception,
then, in fact, I believe that can only result in the dull thud effect; for, I suspect, the
metaphysically inclined have only their intuitions upon which to rely and there is no
genuinely impartial and empirical way to determine which of them has greater utility.
5.
Chemero 2003 (182-184) has a very nice introduction to some other ways of
understanding affordances.
6.
Note that it is Gibson’s idea that I am discussing, not the more popularly and
widely used idea of “affordances” found in the work of Donald Norman. (Norman
1993/2013).
4.

Gibson introduced affordances to capture what he took to be the
essential “complementarity” between organisms and environment.
He believed such complementarity could be lost in two different ways,
exemplified respectively by the languages of physics and phenomenology.
Physics employs basic explanatory properties such as mass, charge,
spin. These are paradigmatic objective properties, namely, properties
instantiated independently of any actual or potential response to the
property bearer on the part of organisms…. [However,] what the
organism is a perceiver of, and a behaver in, are environments (or
niches). Gibson’s idea is that the organism and the environment make
an inseparable pair, where each term has to be understood relative to the
other” (Scarantino 2003, 950).
On the other hand, Gibson took phenomenologists to assume that “the
valence of an object is bestowed upon it in experience, and bestowed by a
need of the observer” (Gibson 2015, 130).7 But he denied this, claiming
instead that an affordance can be present in an environment even if an
agent never perceives it (Gibson 2015, 130).
The relation of Gibson’s idea of affordances to the phenomena
describable in the standard terms of physics deserves special mention.
As Gibson notes in the quotation above, and in many other places in his
discussions, the idea of affordances is not within the sphere of what can
be described in standard physics. But it is consistent with it – he was not
suggesting we go back to the ages before Galileo, Descartes, Newton,
and Darwin. The abstractions that were embedded in those scientific
achievements came at a cost, namely, that what was available in the ages
before the scientific revolution was a way of describing the lived in world
This looks like a metaphysical view about the nature of our perceptions, and perhaps
that is what it is. If so, it is outside my purview to adjudicate between that view and its
competitors – and if it is not a metaphysical view then it is an empirical view (and none
of us at this mini-conference is in a position to render views about empirical matters).

James Hamilton

There are two claims in this formulation that must be attended
to. The first is that affordances are provided by the environment and to the
animal (including non-human animals). The second is that the term implies
something, namely “complementarity” between animal and environment.
The first claim is easily misunderstood as denying Darwinian evolutionary
theory because it may seem to suggest there are purposes lying behind
those offerings; but Gibson was quite emphatic that it did not. This can be
explained by thinking about what “complementarity” in the second claim
is supposed to mean. Here is one gloss:
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conflict could emerge quite naturally by setting Bruineberg and Rietveld
and others in the 2014 special edition of Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
on “radical embodied cognitive neuroscience” (Bruineberg and Rietveld
2014, 1) alongside Vartanian and his colleagues, who offer accounts of
how specific mechanisms underlie “systematic variations in architectural
features [leading] to behavioral outcomes” (VartanianEtAl. 2015, 10446).
For that reason, were I adjudicating between them as empirical views of
perception, I would stress the importance of the theoretical grounds for and
against the various tendencies in neuroscience and neuroaesthetics.
However, I will discuss the topic of this section only within the
constraints of a particular account of what “affordances” are, and I will
not attempt the daunting task of asking which of those two views of
neuroscience, if either, reflects the correct empirical (or metaphysical)
view.4
Many ecological psychologists themselves think that, at least to
date, the notion of “affordances” is not explained well, and there are
various accounts of how his notion of affordances leads, or doesn’t, to
Gibson’s notions of “direct perception” and “atmosphere” (McGrenere
and Ho 2000, Chemero 2003, Scarantino 2003, Tvedebrink and Jelic
2018).5 Even when they say they are “going back to J. J. Gibson’s early
formulation,” there is still quite a bit of what might be called “selection”
going on. Be that as it may, we can still make some progress by focusing
on this definition offered for “affordances” by Gibson himself:

7.
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Figure 4.2: Performative Affordances. As opportunities for action, affordances
always imply bodily coupling, they are shapes in the world that shape the body
and vice-versa. Performative affordances are designed with a specific purpose,
to evoke a prescribed response. This does not mean that the affordance will
not perform other unforeseen gestures and responses, but that it is configured
according to a very specific purpose. An outstanding example of an umwelt with
nested performative affordances that work in concert in a dynamic system is Alvar
Aalto’s Paimio Sanatorium—this is a rare example of a building that was intended
to do, rather than being an assemblage of “esthetically pleasing forms,” yet whose
outcome is exceedingly pleasing.

I now suggest that what we perceive when we look at objects are their
affordances, not their qualities. We can discriminate the dimensions of
difference if required to do so in an experiment, but what the object
affords us is what we “normally pay attention to.” The special quality
of objects into which an object can be analyzed is ordinarily not noticed
(Gibson 2015, 126, emphases added).
In this and a number of other passages Gibson might appear to
conflate “perception,” which can be sub-personal (i.e., occurring below the
level of personal awareness) and “attention,” which almost never is – and,
whether he did so or not, this has likely been the cause of much mischief
when others have been tempted to adopt various of these ideas. But what
it comes to is just that what we normally perceive when we look at objects
are not the features of an object that would be useful in “discriminat[ing]
the dimension[s] of their difference[s]” nor noting the “special quality of
objects into which an object can be analyzed,” but only those features of
an object that are useful to us as living creatures in a lived environment.
However, what I want to call attention to and challenge in this
presentation is the idea that one can get an understanding of the object in
any important sense for free just by perceiving or attending to an object.
This can be seen by asking what sort of meaning it is that arises from
perceiving or attending to whatever makes some object look like, for
example, a seat? To be sure, Gibson’s attention was elsewhere when he
wrote this book. Indeed, he thought that: “The central question for the
theory of affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether
information is available in ambient light for perceiving them” (Gibson
2015, 132).
Consequently, Gibson spent a good deal of space and time
examining, or at least confirming, that such information is indeed available
in ambient light. And then in an attempt to make his theory internally
consistent, and get at what he called “direct perception,” he described
what he calls “information pick up” as an alternative to “information
processing” (Gibson 2015, 139-161). But I am not going to discuss that
aspect of his view; and instead will concentrate on the distinction I have
just mentioned between perceiving one kind of “meaning” and gaining
“understanding.”

James Hamilton

And, so, he was led to this:
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that was precisely what was abstracted from in order to make those
achievements possible. That such abstraction achieved a great deal in gains
with respect to offering true theories of mathematics and about the world
is undeniable. But every achievement requiring abstraction has objective
losses as well as and gains. And here, Gibson focuses on losses.
In particular, what was lost in the subsequent account of
perception was the fact that perception came to be thought of as
independent of the life of the perceiving animal and of the function of
the object being perceived as well. In contrast he claimed that perception
is “relative” to both (Gibson 2015, 120).
“If we assume that [an object] can be distinguished as having just
these properties [of affording us a place to sit], it should look [like it can
be sat on, and] if the surface properties [of that object] are seen relative
to the body surfaces, the self, they constitute a seat and have meaning”
(Gibson 2015, 120).
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3.a. Functions in biology

Philosophical discussions of functions have been around since
Aristotle who held the commonsense view that functions are in objects
by means of the designs of their designer(s). It followed, as William
Paley noted, that if you could discover a function in biology (such as the
function of the eye), you could assume there was a designer lurking in the
wings. (Although, even based on this evidence alone, you might not know
how well-designed the object is compared to other such organs and, so, how
good, bad, or mediocre, the designer was.) But, ever since Darwin, this
kind of explanation of at least natural functions – which seem endemic
in biological theories – will no longer work. Either one no longer sees
room for functional explanations in biology, and so declares all functional
talk among biologists to be metaphorical, or one gives some sort of
“naturalistic” account of the term and so makes it possible to continue to
understand it literally (Godfrey-Smith 1993, 189-191).
The notions I will quickly sketch here are all attempts at
providing a naturalistic account of the term. Some of them are grounded
in what everyone might say – and so are connected to the project of
offering so-called “conceptual analyses” of the term and are refutable by
counterexamples. Others restrict their discussion just to what biologists
and others need in order to continue talk about functions in some literal
way and tend to be disconnected to conceptual analysis offering, in
contrast, theoretical definitions of the term which are only refutable if
they turn out to have less utility for scientific uses.8

“Functions,” they noted, “can be characterized by reference to possibly
nonexistent future events. Furthermore, they should be characterized
that way, because only then will they play the explanatory role they
need to play, for instance, in biology. The way to construe functions in
a forward-looking manner, we suggest, is (roughly) to construe them in
the manner of dispositions (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 189).

There is more to this, with respect to explaining “capacity” talk, for example. But this
suffices for present purposes. Also see Godfrey-Smith 1993, 201-207, for an explanation
of why there is no unification of these several ideas about the functions of natural or
artifactual objects.

James Hamilton

You will recall that we said we would come back to the point that
adaptations and maladaptations – even to needs – do not, by themselves,
entail the presence of purposes such as the meeting of needs. This is
reflected, perhaps, in Gibson’s idea of affordances. It is certainly behind
the debate about the functions, purposes, and goals of artifacts, as that
has played out among historians and philosophers of science. And I want
to use a brief rehearsal of the philosophical discussion of functions to
bring out the problem I have just hinted at that can be rooted in Gibson’s
idea of how human beings and other animals perceive, and what it is they
perceive, by rehearsing a bit of the philosophical discussion of functions
in biology as well as in artifacts.

Of the former kind, one should list Larry Wright’s 1973 account
in an essay on the use of functional terms in biology in which he focused
attention on the idea that functions are appealed to when explaining the
presence or continued existence of a feature in some organism. Such an
explanation, in particular, allowed us to distinguish between functional
properties that an organism had and the accidental properties it might
well also have. “The function of the heart is pumping blood,” Wright
wrote, “not producing a thumping noise or making wiggly lines on
electrocardiograms, which are also things it does” (Wright 1973, 141).
Robert Cummins nearly immediately noted that “an attempt to explain
the presence of something by appeal to what it does – its function – is
bound to leave unexplained why something else that does the same thing
– a functional equivalent – isn’t there instead” (Cummins 1975, 745). He
offered the contrasting view that “the function of an organ or process
(or whatever) is appealed to [in order] to explain the biological capacities
of the organism containing it, and from these capacities conclusions are
drawn concerning the chances of survival for organisms of that type”
(Cummins 1975, 751).9
Peter Achinstein offered yet a third view in 1977 arguing for
a substantially different idea and denying that “function sentences,” as
he called them, rarely are offered to explain the existence or continued
existence of any features. “Function sentences” all aim to attribute a
function to some means to an end and such that “for any function there
is an associated end which can be formulated in a propositional way”
(Achinstein 1977, 360, my emphasis). Almost a decade later, John Bigelow
and Robert Pargetter 1987 offered a new account which they called
“forward looking.”
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How this is currently determined is by means of some sort of Bayesian analysis of
theoretical utility.
8.
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[T]he definition of “proper function” looks to history rather than
merely to present properties or dispositions to determine function. Easy
cases of items having proper functions are body organs and instinctive
behaviors. A proper function of such an organ or behavior is, roughly,
a function that its ancestors have performed that has helped account
for proliferation of the genes responsible for it, hence helped account
for its own existence. But the definition of “proper function” covers,
univocally, the functions of many other items as well, including the
functions of learned behaviors, reasoned behaviors, customs, language
devices such as words and syntactic forms, and artifacts (Millikan
1989, 289).
This too is intended to be a technical definition, focusing on the
actual histories of the actual organisms and artifacts that we encounter in
biology, psychology, art history, and so on.
The common theme that I want to stress in these various
discussions of functions – both natural and artifactual, and both standardly
analytic and theoretical – is a reluctance to endorse, even sometimes in the
cases where there are intentional agents, the force of those intentions in
explaining the functions that artifacts have. This is not only motivated by the
widely (and correctly) reported idea that users might interpret the design
of the artifact along intentional lines that the maker did not have, but
instead has been pushed forward by the view that , roughly, the functions
of artifacts are no more determined by the intentions of the designers or
makers, even though clearly those agents often do have intentions directed
at creating objects with functions, than are the functions of natural objects.

There is more to this as well, and the actual argument, only suggested here, appears on
191, while the fullest statement of the view does not appear until 192.
10.
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Instead, the functions of artifacts are determined by whether
the objects so produced (i.e., produced intentionally) have features that
continue to be responsible for what those objects are, why they continue
to exist, or how they contribute to further functionally defined ends;
however, they came to have those features. The epistemic corollary of this
claim is that agents who grasp the functions of objects – again whether
the object has that function by nature or by design – do so by grasping
the features of the objects that are responsible for what those objects are,
why they continue to exist, or how the contribute to further functionally
defined ends, independently of any knowledge (or lack of it) concerning
how those objects came to have the functions that they did.

3.b. Functions in works of art

Interpretations of works of art – which correspond to what
architects often call “readings” of buildings – are aimed at a grasp of
what most philosophers of art have called “understanding.” Now none
of us owns that word, so I take this to be a technical usage whose merit,
or demerit, will depend on its usefulness. But this is the sense of the word
that is important to us. It concerns what the work is for, is about, or means.
Note this is not the same sense of “means” that we encountered
earlier when discussing Gibson’s idea of the objects of perception. There
we were concerned only with perceiving affordances, which came just to
this: the most we can get from a perception of an affordance is a possible
function the object has relative to some particular animal. We do not
usually get the work’s actual function, if any, or even a full account of the
functions of its parts, again if any (they may have none). So, this does not
get us an interpretation – and understanding – of the work of art in the
sense we need in order to evaluate the work as successful or not. For it
does not even get us to a sense of what the work – in this case a designed
space – is for, let alone what it is about, or might mean to someone (or,
in the possibly non-existent case, to everyone). And this entails that it
does not get us genuine understanding of a work of art for free, just by
perceiving it or by attending to it.
In other words, the same wariness of authorial intentions that is
present in philosophical discussions of functions in biology and artifacts
is now a commonplace view – although not the dominant view – within
philosophy of art (Irvin 2006; Nathan 2006). Grasping the function of an
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This view has come to be called “the propensity” account of biological
functions.10 What marks it off from the predecessors was not only that
it targeted what biologists would be inclined to say – rather than just
everyone – but also that it was offering a theoretical definition, one whose
relative correctness would be measured not by how well it squared with
everyday talk but would be measured only by its utility among biologists
and other scientists.
The last view I will survey in this brief account occurs in Ruth G.
Millikan’s historical-biological account of functions which holds that:
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of our eyes contains, the human susceptibility to “change blindness,” and
the persistent effects of “inattentional blindness), and so on. In short,
even on a theory of affordances, there is much the designer must do by
way of data collection and inferential reasoning in order to increase their
credences that some contraption they have designed will work. There is
no shortcut to understanding on the part of appreciators, and none on the
part of designers who design things for them.

James Hamilton

work of art, like grasping the function of any artifact that has one – such
as a product designed to have a function (for example, a chair or a video
game) – is not done by grasping the intention with which it was made but
by grasping features of the object itself, the ones responsible either for its
existence, its continued existence, or its contribution to other functionally
defined ends. Interestingly, this comports well with what Gibson has to
say when he claims we do not perceive the features of objects but only
their affordances. This we have glossed as consistent with physics and the
cartesian coordinate system – as Gibson seems to have intended – and as
grasping those features of an object that appear to be useful to us as living
creatures in a lived environment.11
You may recall our two questions: (1) On behalf of users, those
who would appreciate a product (for example, a building or a design
element) — how do you come to have very high credences that a particular
thing, or aspect of it, is useable in some particular way if, in advance, you
were not told to expect that it is? And (2) – on behalf of designers (for
example, product designers or architects) and perhaps makers — what
data would you need to encounter to increase your credence that you
could either use some “contraption” in the way it has evolved or design
some contraption so that it can be used the way you intend it to be used?
It will come as no surprise when I answer the first question with a “No,”
at least not without understanding. But this requires inference. This form
of understanding involves having prior expectations and then, crucially,
updating conditional on the data you – the user – are presented. In this
case, clearly a part of those expectations will be having been told what to
expect, and the data will be the experiences the user has – which very well
may consist largely of perceptions of the affordances of the objects the
user is presented with.
The situation concerning question (2) is clearly more complicated.
Even if you can count on people reasoning in accord with what you have
built in to the design by way of affordances, affordances are, remember,
relative to particular human animals. So this will require you to know who
those particular human beings are, what their socio/cultural background is,
what is common among them in terms of social biases, perceptual abilities
or capacities (and incapacities as well – such as the blind spot that each

This seems to be what Gibson means, even though this result also seems to challenge
some of what he says about “direct perception.”
11.

Figure 4.3: Panel discussion following the presentations at the Interface event 28 March
2018, in Regnier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas. From left to right Dr. Harry Mallgrave, Sarah
Robinson (with microphone), and Dr. James Hamilton.
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Architecture is Something We Do: A Postscript
Bob Condia

Affordances and the Potential for Architecture

A symposium debating the
significance of affordances,
atmosphere and primed
behaviors within the design
and sensory appreciation of
measured spaces, i.e. architecture.

“An important fact about the affordances of
the environment is that they are in a sense
objective, real, and physical, unlike values and
meanings, which are often supposed to be
subjective, phenomenal, and mental. . . . It is
equally a fact of the environment and a fact of
behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet
neither. An affordance points both ways, to the
environment and to the observer.”
(J.J. Gibson, 1979/86, p. 129)

Fallen Angel, Igor Mitoraj, while on exhibition at
the Opera Del Duomo, Pisa, February 26, 2015
(Photograph, Bob Condia)

“Affordances and the Potential for Architecture,” 8:30 – 12:30, 28 March 2019 Regnier Hall, APDesign,
Kansas State University. An INTERFACE event of the Academy of Neuroscience for Architecture,
Advisory Council. Organized by APDesign’s P\Lab2003S: Graciously sponsored by HOK Architects and
the Regnier Chair for Research. AIA professional Learning Units (3) are in application and expected.

Agenda:
8:19
Coffee and loitering in the Regnier Hall lobby.

8:45
9:00
9:45
10:30

Introduction to Affordances in Architecture and the order of things.

Bob Condia, AIA, APDesign, Kansas State University.

“Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of Design.”

Sarah Robinson, Architect \ Philosopher, owner Sarah Robinson Architects, San Francisco and Pavia, Italy.

“Just What Can Architects Afford?”

Dr. Harry Francis Mallgrave, Architect \ Historian, Illinois Institute of Technology (Emeritus)

Coffee Break

10:50

“How Do Designers and Appreciators Discover Affordances?”

11:40

Panel Discussion: Sarah Robinson, Harry Mallgrave and James Hamilton.

Dr. James Hamilton, Philosopher, Kansas State University.

Bob Condia in moderation.

12:30 Closing remarks and adjournment.
The symposium is free and open to all. For more i nformati on and to r. s. v. p. pl ease visit <pl ab2003s. com>.

As we are arranging this concise manuscript for publication, I sense, or
better realize that it will be an important contribution to our thinking
about architecture, space, and perception. Quite simply, Affordances
and the Potential for Architecture discloses that our engagement with
architecture or the built environment is a deeply rooted experience
operating on many levels. In a biological and philosophical sense, it reveals
that the mind is inseparable from the body, just as the body is inseparable
from its environment. It displays the world before us as rife with potential
movements, activities, engagements, for which we continuously rehearse
the myriad possibilities and choose the best course of action. It defines
our phenomenological natures through our readiness-for-action, and it
thereby suggests that we can improve the spaces, buildings, and landscapes
that we inhabit by mastering how we enact and understand them.
We are grateful to Andrea Jelić for her contribution, “Introduction:
Designing Affordances for the Living-Lived Body?” She begins with the
tender probe of “How architecture affords being-in-the-world?” And, as
she suggests, its value lies in the pervasiveness of the question. Recognizing
the general conceit of humans historically toward abstraction, toward
separating the mind from the body and the body from its situation—
she frames our scaffold for experience as one of environmental mutual
dependenc rather than of detachment. The primacy of our sensory
perception nesting in the body is the story unfolding in the discoveries of
the newer models of cognition, much along the ecological lines of James
Gibson’s thesis of affordances. Can the idea of affordances contribute to
the decisions that architects make? It will certainly add new dimensions
to thought processes.
Sarah Robinson, in “Articulating Affordances: Towards a New Theory of
Design,” makes the same case. Beginning as she does with the rocking
chair’s animation of the porch, she demonstrates that one size doesn’t
fit all. Even as our bodies are similarly constituted and share much
in common, it is the specificity of differences between us that should
instruct designers. There is no “average” body size or standard fighter
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pilot. Instead, there is a poetic double entendre which asks professionals
to understand perception as the active confluence of varying influences
(from personal to bounded), all the while considering the particularities
of the individual person. A theory of affordances recognizes that while
the rocking chair will always provide an affordance of rocking, its activity
depends on its location and the frame of mind of the person so engaged.
Such real participation in life, like rocking in a chair, is the real beauty of
an architectural moment.
In his essay “Just What Can Architects Afford?” Harry Mallgrave advocates
that, after decades of reducing form to conceptual gamesmanship and
usurping models with little kinship to design, one must raise the question
of where this has left the practice of design? Has it improved our cities
or our houses? In the face of the mounting evidence to a contrary, and
in view of the complexity of human life, wants, and desires, shall we
mindlessly follow the same track? The newer biological models disclose
in no uncertain terms that our engagement with buildings and landscapes
is “a whole-body experience,” one grounded not only in our multisensory,
emotional, and visceral responses to the world but also in the phenomenal
or “lived” nature of our being. Standing against the hollowing of human
nature in contemporary digital practice—and with it our existential desire
for seduction—Mallgrave offers the lesson that we are indeed active agents
in the culture that we create, and this built world can indeed be attuned
to our biological and social natures. Thinking of beauty, he suggests, is
also something we do; it is yet another expression of the vital paradisiacal
instinct grounded in human nature.
James Hamilton, isn’t concerned with beauty, but with, “How do
Appreciators and Designers Discover Affordances?” He assigns to
himself the difficult task of arbitrating for the ‘user,’ who might
appreciate a building, while at the same time distrusting the designer to
grasp the real intention of the things they make. In a scholarly way, he
does so by examining Gibson’s claims for affordances, and questioning
the basis for understanding how objects appear to us or are useful within
a specific environment. It seems that affordances have much to do with
the experience or understanding you bring to the artifact. You have to see
a chair as a chair in order to sit in a chair. A secondary and more difficult

notion here is that even if a designer designs a chair, it may still be at odds
with the peculiarities of the individual. As he himself concludes, “There
is no shortcut to understanding on the part of appreciators, and none on
the part of designers who design things for them.”
I often hear architects say they must educate their clients, yet in order to
make this strategy work, designers must be better educated in the needs,
wants, and desires of their clients. Affordances are a way to understand
the environmental actions and behaviors of our species, while recognizing
that which makes us human with individual needs. One size never fits
all, although it begins in a common humanity. Taken in sum, these essays
consider the model of affordances within the context of architecture and
provide a valuable contribution to this discussion of how to conceive,
think, and better attune the human organism with the environment in
which we dwell.
This symposium was the second Interfaces event of ANFA (the Academy
of Neuroscience for Architecture, Salk Institute) held 28 March 2019 in
the Regnier Forum of APDesign, Kansas State University. Instituted by
the ANFA Advisory Council under the encouragement of the ANFA
Board. The event was sponsored by the HOK Studio and the Regnier
Chair in Architectural Research. In acknowledgement, let me extend our
gratitude to Victor Regnier for his continued support to the Department
of Architecture’s Regnier Chair for Research; to HOK Architects,
especially the Kansas City Office, for their support of a thesis design
studio offering the fruits of neuroscience for architectural consideration.
A particular thanks goes to Michael Arbib, Chair of the ANFA Advisory
Board, challenging the community of architects and scientists to increase
our discussion. My personal gratitude goes the fine staff of P\Lab2003S:
Shea Ensor, Marilina Bedros, Dakota Smith, Jaasiel Duarte-Terrazas,
and Alexandra Mesias for organizing the details and staffing the event.
We deeply appreciate graphic efforts of Kaden Beilman, Dakota and
Alexandra. A special recognition to Dr. Thomas Bell for the copy editing.
We thank the ANFA Board for allowing us to carry their good name,
particularly Fred Marks and Matthew Smith, and we salute Andrea, Sarah,
Harry and Jim for their contributions to this symposium and advancing
the oratory on affordances.
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Andrea Jelić

Harry Francis Mallgrave

Andrea Jelić is an architect and postdoctoral
researcher at the Department of Architecture,
Design and Media Technology, Aalborg
University, Denmark. Her research focuses
on exploring the nature of architectural
experience from the integrated perspectives of
architecture, embodied cognitive science, and
phenomenology. She has published articles in this
emerging interdisciplinary field in architectural
and scientific journals, and guest lectured at
international conferences and workshops in
USA and Europe. Dr. Jelić is Advisory Council
member of ANFA and faculty member in the
master program “Neuroscience applied to
architectural design” at IUAV University of
Venice.

Harry Francis Mallgrave is a distinguished
professor emeritus from IIT and an Honorary
Fellow of the Royal Institute of British
Architects. Through the course of his early
career, his publications largely dealt with the
history and theory of architecture, but in recent
years his focus shifted to the implications of the
human and biological sciences for the future of
design. He received his PhD in architecture from
the University of Pennsylvania and is a recipient
of the Alice Davis Hitchcock Award. His most
recent book is From Object to Experience: The
New Culture of Design (Bloomsbury: 2018).
He is currently writing a book on the idea of
“Building Paradise”- how utopian models have
shifted in the past and in what ways they will
shift in the future.

Sarah Robinson

James R. Hamilton

Sarah Robinson is an architect practicing in
San Francisco and Italy. She holds degrees in
Philosophy with honors from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison and University of Fribourg
in Switzerland and an M. Arch from Taliesin,
the Frank Lloyd Wright School of Architecture,
where she served as the founding president of
the Board of Trustees. She has written Nesting:
Body, Dwelling, Mind, Mind in Architecture:
Neuroscience, Embodiment and the Future
of Design, with Juhani Pallasmaa and the
forthcoming book, Home is Love, in addition
to numerous literary and critical essays. She
cofounded and edits the journal Intertwining
and teaches in the NAAD program at IUAV in
Venice, she lives in Pavia, Italy.

James R. Hamilton, Professor of Philosophy at
Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas,
USA, works on aesthetic issues and issues in
the philosophy of art. He is an empirically
and formally oriented philosopher, working on
topics that are to do with the nature of theatrical
enactment, how to model the reception of
performances in theater, music, and dance,
the reception and aesthetics of architecture
and scenography, and our interactions with
puppets and other animated objects. He strives
to make his work informed by related work
in fields like decision theory, formal learning
theories, cognitive neuroscience, psychology,
anthropology, and history.
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